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Abstract 
 
The Malacca and Singapore Straits are one of the most important maritime chokepoints in the 
world, linking the dynamic economies in East Asia with the Middle East and Europe. A disruption 
in the area would devastate trade and destabilize regional security relationships. An intentional 
distruption, such as a terrorist attack, would have additional psychological consequences that would 
likely spill over into the economic sphere.  
 
This paper assumes the disruption is caused by a terrorist attack in the Straits and uses this scenario 
to examine the options available for increasing maritime security in the waterway. It specifically 
looks at the ways three external actors with high stakes in the Straits – the United States, European 
Union and People’s Republic of China – can contribute to security. All three stakeholders have 
strong interests in keeping the Straits open and safe for all international maritime traffic. Each 
would also benefit individually from cooperating with the other external actors. 
 
This paper argues that security can best be achieved by the three external actors working together 
to engage the littoral states in multilateral cooperation. It also discusses the platforms on which 
such cooperation can be built and how it should be implemented.  
 
Keywords: Malacca Straits, maritime security, counterterrorism, multilateral cooperation 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Malacca Straits, the 500-mile-long funnel-shaped body of water running between Indonesia 
and Malaysia and tapering to a mere 1.5 miles wide,1 has long been a crucial international water-
way. It was one of the three keys to the Portugese empire in Asia (the other two being Goa and 
Hormuz). Portugal dominated trade in Asia for more than a century, until two setbacks precipitated 
its decline: the Japanese Shogunate’s decision to cut off trade with the outside world and the Dutch 
conquest of Malacca in 1641 that severed the link between Goa and Macau. For centuries, Malacca 
has controlled trade in the region. 
Imagine this trade were disrupted today. Imagine the Straits were completely blocked by the results 
of some human action, either intentional or accidental. The impact would no doubt have global 
reach on many levels: political, security, economic and, last but not least, psychological. The most 
dynamic economies of the modern world (China, Japan, India) would suffer heavily from sudden 
shortages but would by no means be the only victims. Are the states that particularly depend on the 
Malacca Straits sufficiently prepared for such an incident? What would be the impact of such a dis-
ruption on global cooperation and, vice versa, how could the global community cooperate to help 
prepare against such a crisis? With regard to security and regional stability these questions are of 
particular importance to three major security stakeholders: the United States, the People’s Republic 
of China, and – the European Union. 
This paper assumes a terrorist attack causes the disruption, as it is a plausible potential cause for a 
major crisis in and around the Malacca Straits. It assumes the attack is large and devastating 
enough to severely disrupt or completely halt shipping through the area for at least five days. Such 
a disruption would heavily damage the economic and energy interests, not to mention the security 
and military concerns, of all three external stakeholders. The possibilities for a unilateral response 
to this scenario would be quite limited. Indeed, many experts and state governments have argued 
that multilateral cooperation is now more important than ever to deal with today’s global challen-
ges. Only through collective action, they say, can states combat transnational issues like terrorism. 
This scenario is no exception. Given that this terrorist attack would both harm all three actors’ inte-
rests and allow only restricted unilateral responses, there is good reason for the three external actors 
to cooperate in preparation for this scenario. Moreover, one could argue that because the Malacca 
Straits are of high interest to all three parties but not a top priority for any, the actors would be mo-
re willing to cooperate here than on other issues (such as Taiwan). This is especially true because 
the Malacca Straits cannot be controlled or governed by any of the three actors. They are all equal-
ly outsiders in this case, yet they would all benefit from cooperation.  
Arguing, therefore, that the attack should catalyze a cooperative trilateral response, the paper exam-
ines how each actor’s interests in the Malacca Straits would be affected by the attack and in what 
form(s) a cooperative response might develop. It looks at what cooperation (if any) is already hap-
pening and, inter alia, the existing military, civilian, multilateral and bilateral structures on which 
further cooperation could be built. It then examines the actors’ approaches to counter-terrorism and 
strategies for crisis response to see where and how common action might be implemented. This 
scenario thus functions as a test case to analyze some of the dynamics of interaction and cooperati-
on between the U.S., EU and China. Both ASEAN’s and the littoral states’ style(s) of counter-
terrorism and crisis response will also be taken into consideration, as all three outside actors will 
have to deal with their influence in the area.2  
After an introduction of the background literature (section 2) and scenario (section 3), the paper 
examines the three actors’ direct military, economic and political concerns in the Malacca Straits 
(section 4). Restricting the study both geographically and topically in this way allows the resear-
cher to develop one plausible path for how the existing dynamics might play out in the future. What 
does each actor perceive to be the largest threats to its interests, and how would a terrorist attack 
affect them? These threat perceptions determine how each actor would want to respond to the at-
                                                     
1  Catherine Zara Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios,” Terrorism Monitor IV issue 
7 (6 April 2006): 2. 
2  ASEAN member states are Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam.  
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tack – what it would prioritize. After analyzing the actors’ threat perceptions the project moves on 
to identify the issues where priorities intersect. It analyzes current security cooperation activities to 
identify promising foundations for further cooperation (section 5). Finally, it draws some conclusi-
ons, makes recommendations for trilateral cooperation and discusses the possibilities for further 
research (section 6).  
This project’s significance lies precisely in its limited scope. It does not attempt to look at all the 
factors influencing relations between the actors in the region; such a comprehensive project would 
require years of research and analysis. Nor does it attempt to identify the most plausible or pro-
bable future of international relations in the region. Instead it uses this very distinct scenario as a 
model of multilateral security cooperation under relatively conducive circumstances. To maintain a 
‘petri dish’ effect the study does not look at possible external, geo-strategic influences that in reali-
ty could hinder cooperation, such as major power rivalries, trade imbalances or human rights in 
China. This scenario-based analysis is intended to be an initial step toward further research in such 
areas as U.S.-EU-Chinese cooperation in other regions or multilateral cooperation for maritime 
security in Southeast Asia. The strategies for cooperation developed in this project should provide 
fodder for studies on these larger topics.  
The issue of a terrorist attack in the Malacca Straits was a hot topic a few years after 9-11 but has 
cooled since a number of maritime security experts pointed out its improbability. It is not at all cer-
tain that an attack will occur or be successful; there is an ongoing debate over the likelihood of a 
successful terrorist attack in the Straits. However, although there are no visible signs that an attack 
would really happen the probable costs in terms of lives lost as well as economic and environmen-
tal damage make it worthwhile to discuss attack scenarios, develop disaster response plans and 
work to increase the security and safety of the Straits. Southeast Asia – with its combination of lo-
cal terrorist groups, history of piracy and sea-based armed robbery, and globally important sea la-
nes – is certainly an area at high risk of a maritime terrorist attack. It is therefore in the interest of 
all governments involved to increase maritime security in the region. This project revives the Ma-
lacca scenario through the lens of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., EU and China because 
although unlikely at the moment, it is a plausible future and a useful analytical tool. Looking at this 
scenario now, in a period of relative calm and security in the Malacca Straits, facilitates careful and 
unhasty policy analysis and recommendations for cooperation. Moreover, here there is a clear in-
tersection of interests between these three important external powers, which is not often the case. 
The Malacca Straits scenario offers a rare opportunity to explore plausible options for cooperation 
between three external actors with little history of working together.    
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2. Background 
 
The Malacca Straits have also been the focus of a great deal of attention from the media, security 
experts and politicians in the last few years. After 9/11 the Bush Administration began framing 
Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In this context, begin-
ning in 2002 and peaking in 2004-2005, a number of articles were published highlighting the fact 
that although governments had greatly improved aviation security, other transportation sectors re-
mained extremely vulnerable. Experts began to outline the weak points in the global trade network 
and elaborate the possible consequences of a terrorist attack. Maritime security was identified as 
particularly exposed. The Straits, one of the most important waterways in the region as well as ar-
guably one of the most dangerous, attracted a great deal of scrutiny. 
 
Figure 1: The Malacca Straits  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Malacca Straits Close-Up3 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3  United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” 
www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html (accessed 07 April 2008). 
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The predicted consequences of a maritime terrorist attack on the Straits varied widely, but all 
authors tended to agree that a large-scale disruption in shipping would severely damage both local 
and global economies. A typical example of such predictions read, 
“Were terrorist pirates to hijack a large bulk carrier or oil tanker, sail it into one of the chokepoints, and scuttle it to 
block the sea-lane, the consequences for the global economy would be severe: a spike in oil prices, an increase in 
the cost of shipping due to the need to use alternate routes, congestion in sea-lanes and ports, more expensive mari-
time insurance, and probable environmental disaster.”4  
These setbacks could cost millions or even billions of dollars, depending on the nature and location 
of the attack.  
 
 
2.1  Possible Attack Methods 
 
The majority of tactics for employing ships in a maritime terrorist attack fall into three categories: 
“ship as delivery system,” “ship as target” and “ship as weapon.”  
 
2.1.1 Ship as Delivery System 
 
Terrorists could quite easily exploit the global container network to move weapons or dangerous 
substances around the world. Today’s global production chain employs the “just enough, just in 
time” delivery system, in which components arrive at their destination precisely when they are 
needed to reduce or eliminate inventory holding costs. This system relies on a large fleet of various 
ships, low tarriffs and other trade barriers, and minimal security inspection delays in order to func-
tion at maximum efficiency. This economic pressure for speed, combined with the vast number of 
containers being moved around the world at any given time means that only one to five percent5 of 
all containers are inspected. Even Singapore, “arguably one of the world’s most sophisticated and 
well-protected commercial maritime ports,” does not require vessels to declare the contents of their 
cargo if they are transiting through its waters rather than stopping in the port.6 Thus “the statistical 
probability of successfully smuggling a weapon or bomb is much greater than the probability of 
intercepting one.”7 Once a weapon was smuggled into a port it could be detonated remotely. Some 
have suggested detonation by timer, but this seems impractical as there is little way to predict e-
xactly when a given container will reach its destination. A “dirty bomb,” an explosive containing 
chemical, biological or nuclear material, could be set off in a major port like Singapore or in the 
middle of the narrowest point of the Malacca Strait to effect considerable damage. 
 
2.1.2 Ship as Target 
 
This category includes scenarios such as steering a small, explosives-laden boat into the side of a 
tanker or military vessel or planting a bomb aboard a (relatively) easily accessible boat such as a 
passenger ferry or cruise ship. There are precedents for these scenarios. The widely publicized at-
tack on the USS Cole in 2000 off the coast of Yemen is an example of a successful “small boat 
explodes near large vessel,” attack, as was the 2002 Limburg oil tanker incident. Alleged planned 
attacks have included similar suicide missions against U.S. navy ships in Singaporean, Malaysian 
and Indonesian waters8 and in the Indonesian port of Surabaya.9 The Superferry 14 bombing in the 
Philippines in 2004 is widely regarded as the most deadly maritime terrorist act in recent history. 
                                                     
4  Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs 83 issue 6 (Nov-Dec 2004): 67. For another 
example of similar analysis see Michael Richardson, “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism 
in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Survival 46 issue 4 (February 2004): 202-203. 
5  About 5.2 percent of containers entering the U.S. and less than one percent worldwide are inspected. Donna J. 
Nincic, “The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification, WMD and Regime Response,” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28 no. 4 (August 2005): 624. 
6  Chalk, Peter, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and Challenges for the United 
States, Rand Project Air Force Research Monograph (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008): 28, footnote 31. 
7  Chalk, 27.  
8  Chalk, 21. 
9  Maria Ressa, “Terrorism’s New Frontline,” CNN International, 26 February 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ 
WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/29/asia.jihad.3/index.html (accessed 06 June 2008).  
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The crude bomb, made of 16 sticks of dynamite inside a hollow TV, cost less than $400 to make. It 
caused 116 deaths and an incredible amount of fear.10 A U.S. military ship, an oil tanker with a 
Western flag or a cruise ship would all be attractive targets for any terrorist group wanting to make 
an iconic political statement against the West. If the ship also happened to be in the Malacca Straits 
the attack would not only create terror and publicity but also impede the smooth functioning of re-
gional and global trade. 
 
2.1.3 Ship as Weapon 
 
In this category terrorists could shoot a missile into the hull of an oil or LNG (liquid natural gas) 
tanker near a port or shore and ignite the spillout, turning it into a ‘floating bomb.’ They could hi-
jack a ship and drive it into a busy port, again as a floating bomb if they created an explosion on 
board as they crashed into their target. They could also sink a ship in the middle of a narrow ship-
ping lane like the Malacca Strait (known as a “chokepoint” where shipping is forced to use one par-
ticular route), blocking traffic for at least a few days. The ‘floating bomb’ concept has received 
much attention as experts have discussed the logistics of exploding tankers or other cargo vessels 
or setting fire to volatile substances on board. The most commonly discussed substances are liqui-
fied natural gas (LNG), liquified petroleum gas (LPG), oil and ammonium nitrate. The high volume 
of oil traveling by ship all over the world, combined with oil’s well-known combustibility, makes 
oil tankers a highly discussed ‘floating bomb’ possibility. Ammonium nitrate, a common agricultu-
ral fertilizer, is another “Dangerous Maritme Cargo”11 that has received quite a bit of attention. A 
popular ingredient in bombs because it is easily available and forms an extremely powerful explo-
sive when mixed with fuel oil, ammonium nitrate was the main substance in the bombs used in the 
2002 attack on a Bali nightclub.12 An attack with LNG would cause the most damage of any sub-
stance but is also the most difficult to pull off. It is theoretically possible to breach the hull of an 
LNG ship and cause the liquid to spill out into a pool. The inflammable liquid could then vaporize 
into a highly combustible, low-lying cloud. A study commissioned by the U.S. Coast Guard and 
conducted by Sandia National Laboratories asserts that such a cloud, if ignited, would result in a 
fire hot enough to cause burns on exposed skin 1,600 meters away.13 If the cloud floated over a po-
pulated area the damage caused when it ignited would be severe. The fire would then burn back to 
the pooled LNG on the water surface and would continue to burn until the fuel had been used up. 
The heat emitted by such a fire has been reported at 200kW/m2. By comparison, an oil fire can burn 
with as little as 20kW/m2.14 If successful (a highly unlikely possibility, as discussed in section 2.2) 
such an attack could be devastating to the ships, people and infrastructure within a radius of more 
than one kilometer. Any of the floating bomb scenarios poses a considerable threat.  
 
 
2.2 Likelihood of Successful Attack  
 
Most experts agree that a successful attack would have serious economic, political and 
environmental consequences. Yet they come to no accord on whether terrorists would attempt a 
maritime attack in the Straits or whether an attempted attack would be successfully completed. The 
media, especially in Southeast Asia, widely reported worst-case scenarios such as the LNG 
“floating bomb” described above.15 Many pointed to the relatively high frequency of pirate attacks 
in Southeast Asia to show how vulnerable ships are in this region. Terrorists could adopt piracy 
techniques to further their own political goals, to create fear and terror rather than monetary gain.  
                                                     
10  Chalk, 26. 
11  Nincic, 628. 
12  Nincic, 628. 
13  United States Government Accountability Office, Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist 
Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification, GAO Report to Congress, February 2007, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07316.pdf (accessed 9 June 2008): 7. 
14  GAO, 9.  
15  Cf. Associated Foreign Press, “Experts warn of terrorism, piracy in Malacca Straits,” Kuala Lumpur, 13 June 2007, 
5. For an overview see Tamara Renee Shie, “Ports in a Storm? The Nexus Between Counterterrorism, 
Counterproliferation, and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” Pacific Forum CSIS Issues&Insights 4 no. 4 (July 
2004): 3-4. 
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Some maritime security experts, engineers and natural scientists accused these protestations of vul-
nerability of being overly alarmist.16 They stressed the need for much more nuanced studies of the 
dangers faced,17 highlighting the technical problems any attacker would face in most of these sce-
narios. First, hijacking a large tanker is extremely difficult. The large ships transiting the Straits 
with valuable cargos like oil and LNG, as well as the global-route container ships and vehicle car-
riers, would make the biggest “splash” if attacked because they are owned, managed and crewed by 
non-locals and would cause the most damage if blown up. But they are also by far the hardest types 
of ship to attack. They are relatively fast, with an average steaming speed of 15-25 knots, making it 
“virtually impossible, and certainly highly dangerous” for a small speedboat to come alongside. 
They have very high freeboards (the distance from the water surface to the ship deck), meaning 
attackers would have difficulties climbing on board while the vessel was underway. They are rela-
tively high-tech, equipped with security systems and staffed with professional, well-trained crews. 
All new oil tankers as well as LNG vessels are double-hulled, making them far less vulnerable to 
hull breaches. Thus the most attractive targets are the least vulnerable to attack.18  
Even if terrorists were successful in taking over a ship, they would face many further difficulties 
creating the maximum amount of damage as forecast by the ‘alarmists.’ The worst-case LNG sce-
nario described above would almost certainly not occur because so many conditions would have to 
be precisely, perfectly met. First of all, breaching the ship’s hull such that the LNG spilled out to 
create a pool of the correct size would be difficult. The hole in the hull would have to be just the 
right size and in the right location. The weather, composition of the LNG vapor cloud, dimensions 
of the pool and size of the fire would all help determine how hot the fire burned. If any of these 
factors were outside the required limits the fire would not cause so much damage. Furthermore the 
wind could blow the cloud harmlessly out to sea or disperse it before ignition.19 Oil tankers are si-
milarly damage-resistant. The “missile attacks on tankers during the ‘tanker wars’ of the 1980s 
showed how difficult it is to ignite a fire on a tanker.”20 Other factors mitigating the effects of a 
terrorist attack might include the location of the ship at the time of attack, the size of the explosion, 
the number of people nearby, and whether the cargo (if oil or chemicals) spilled. Finally, simply 
sinking a ship in the Malacca Strait, even at One Fathom Bank where the shipping lane narrows to 
0.6 nautical miles, would not have the desired effect because the lane is still wide enough that ves-
sels would most likely be able to steer around a shipwreck.21  
Because these difficulties combine to mean a low probability of successfully carrying out an attack, 
the ‘anti-alarmist’ experts argue that terrorists are unlikely to even attempt one. However, the majo-
rity of experts and government officials agree that the possibility of a terrorist attack on shipping, 
regardless of its probability, is worrisome enough to warrant increased attention. As Tamara Renee 
Shie points out, “[w]hether the probability of a maritime terrorist attack is high or low, the United 
States, or any country, can ill-afford to be unprepared for a devastating marine-based attack on par 
with that of the World Trade Towers in New York City.” Moreover, a less ambitious attack, for 
example on a smaller chemical tanker as discussed below, does have a relatively high probability of 
success and therefore remains within the realm of likely terrorist attack scenarios.22 Experts there-
fore continue to discuss the possibilities for an attack. Particularly for this project, the fact that the 
scenario could occur is sufficient. It provides an excellent platform for examining the external ac-
tors’ interests and priorities in the Malacca Straits as well as how they would benefit from coopera-
ting with one another to improve security in the Straits.  
As demonstrated by the frequency of piracy incidents against the smaller, less well-guarded vessels 
that primarily sail between ports within the Straits rather than transiting through, these vessels are 
                                                     
16  Marcus Hand, “SE Asian terrorists no immediate threat: expert,” Lloyd’s List, 21 February 2008. 
17  For an overview and rebuttal of the most common attack scenarios see Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia.”  
18  Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Mathew Mathai, “Shipping Patterns in the Malacca Straits: An Assessment of the 
Risks to Different Types of Vessel,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29 no. 2 (2007): 309-32. This paper is an 
excellent, detailed study of the vulnerabilities of each type of vessel in the Malacca Straits. 
19  GAO, 17-20. 
20  Bateman, Ho and Mathai, 318. 
21  See Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 2.  
22  Bateman, Ho and Mathai, 318-319. 
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the most likely to be attacked.23 For terrorists looking for maximum publicity, a small tanker carry-
ing oil, volatile chemicals or Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) would be an attractive option. LPG sha-
res many of LNG’s combustible properties but is shipped at a higher temperature on less high-tech 
vessels. Smaller carriers not only travel more slowly and lie closer to the water surface than the 
large vessels, but their smaller crews would also be more easily overwhelmed. They are also easier 
to operate. A second vessel type vulnerable to terrorist attack is a passenger ship such as a ferry or 
cruise ship. There are a number of ferries and cruise lines operating in the Malacca Straits, the 
cruise ships with primarily Western passengers. Indeed, “because cruise ships cater to rich, middle-
class American and European tourists, these vessels provide the type of high-prestige, iconic target 
that would likely resonate with extremist Islamist intent and elicit considerable media attention if 
decisively struck.”24 Although maritime security experts believe terrorists would not attempt to hi-
jack such a vessel “because of the numbers of people onboard and likely problems in boarding and 
seizing control of the ship,” they are quite vulnerable to bomb attacks.25 Many passenger vessels, 
especially ferries, have questionable dockside security. Their publicly available routes and time-
tables facilitate attack planning.26 It would be relatively simple, as demonstrated by the Superferry 
14 attack, to board one of these ships as a passenger and cause an explosion on board. A further 
scenario is a Malacca-specific twist on the “sink a ship” concept. Because a single sunken vessel 
would not halt shipping traffic, blocking or claiming to block the Straits with mines would be far 
more effective.27 Mines are inexpensive, relatively easy to obtain, and easily deployable.  
These three options – small tanker carrying volatile materials, passenger vessel, and mines – repre-
sent the three most likely means terrorists would use to carry out an attack in the Malacca Straits. 
The small tanker scenario could play out in any one of the three ways described above: ship as de-
livery system, ship as target or ship as weapon. The passenger vessel would most likely be a target 
rather than delivery system or weapon since it would be difficult to take control of the ship. The 
mine scenario, of course, does not fit into any of the three categories but is still a probable choice 
for an attack. All of these scenarios are logistically simple enough, with high enough probabilities 
of success, that terrorists might conceivably attempt one of them. This threat should make both lit-
toral and user-state governments stand up and pay attention, as the possible consequences of such 
an attack would be considerable.  
 
                                                     
23  As first pointed out by Young and Valencia, it is mistaken to assume a connection exists between the two 
phenomena. Their motives are very different (economic gain versus political statement), which means that their 
tactics also differ. Pirates prefer to keep as low a profile as possible so they will not get caught and can continue 
their activities for as long as possible. Terrorists, on the other hand, hope to attract a great deal of attention and 
reach a large audience. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any connections between pirates and terrorist groups. 
However, because the actual method used to attack a ship would be similar it is useful to look at piracy statistics to 
see where, when, how and against what types of ships attacks have most often been carried out. Adam J. Young and 
Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 25 no. 2 (August 2003). 
24  Chalk, 26. 
25  Bateman, Ho and Mathai, 322. 
26  Chalk, 25. 
27  Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,”  3. 
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3. The Scenario 
 
This paper’s centerpiece is a scenario comprising a terrorist attack on the Malacca Straits that 
blocks shipping traffic for at least five days. The cause could be any of the scenarios discussed in 
the previous section. Oil or chemicals from a blown-up small tanker could spill into the Strait; a 
hijacked ship could be rammed into one of the larger ports (Singapore Port would be particularly 
damaging); a passenger ferry with a bomb on board could explode in a port; the Straits could be 
mined. Any of these scenarios would probably be enough to force shipping to detour around the 
Malacca Straits for at least five days. Exactly how shipping becomes blocked is irrelevant to this 
study. The key point is that somehow so much damage is caused that international shipping cannot 
pass through the Straits for some time. Vessels would have to re-route through the Lombok-
Makassar or Sunda Straits in Indonesia. Cooperative preparation (i.e., cooperative contingency 
plans) for a multilateral response to such a large crisis would be most logical, as the Malacca Straits 
are one of the most important international waterways in the world. All three external actors would 
be heavily affected by the attack, yet no one state would be capable of responding unilaterally – 
even the United States. Particularly because of the littoral states’ sensitivity to outside interference 
in their affairs and to any perceived violation of their sovereignty, carefully non-threatening coop-
eration by the three external actors would likely be most effective and productive. This paper 
examines the possible fallout of this crisis scenario and, based on confluences of the three actors’ 
interests and priorities, identifies opportunities for the U.S., EU and China to cooperate to improve 
security in the Malacca Straits. 
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4. External Actors’ Interests in the Malacca Straits 
 
This section will highlight each actor’s interest in maintaining free, functioning shipping through 
the Malacca Straits, in part by illustrating the consequences of the scenario’s blockage. It will first 
describe the possible consequences of the terrorist attack scenario to global shipping and trade, as 
all three actors would be affected by and have to deal with this aspect of the fallout. It will then 
discuss each of the three external actors’ individual economic, political and strategic concerns in 
the event of a five-day blockage. In other words, what investments do the actors have in the Malac-
ca Straits, and how would they be damaged or threatened by a blockage? Exposing each actor’s 
interests and the (perceived) threats to them will facilitate the identification of intersecting interests 
and, therefore, opportunities for cooperation (elaborated in section 6). 
 
 
4.1 Consequences to Global Shipping and Trade 
 
Global shipping has for centuries been forced by geographic circumstances and and weather condi-
tions, not to mention pressure to sail the shortest route, to strongly prefer the Malacca Straits over 
other possible routes.  
 
Figure 3:  Map of World Shipping Lanes28  
The Malacca Straits are located in the center of the right third of this map. 
 
Figure 3, a map of world trade routes, illustrates global shipping’s dependence on the Malacca 
Straits. While trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific trade spreads out across a wide band of ocean, ship-
ping lanes narrow considerably at certain maritime chokepoints. The Malacca Straits is one of the 
most important chokepoints in the world. All shipping across the Indian Ocean must steam to the 
northern tip of Indonesian Sumatra, then turn south-east and maneuver between the northern coast 
of Indonesian Sumatra and the southern coast of Malaysia. The routes from South Africa and Suez 
to East Asia converge at the northern end of the Strait of Malacca, while all routes from East Asia 
to the Indian Ocean converge at Singapore. The density of shipping is hence much higher in Ma-
lacca’s narrow sea lane.  
Experts agree that a terrorist attack on the magnitude of this paper’s scenario would cause severe 
economic damage. Indeed, About 400 shipping lines and 700 ports worldwide regularly utilize the 
                                                     
28  Christine Dell'Amore, “Photo in the News: Wild Earth No More?” National Geographic News, 28 June 2007, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/06/images/070628-human-footprint_big.jpg (accessed 24 July 
2008). 
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Malacca Straits for transit.29 The consequences would quickly reach all corners of the globe. Yet 
many of the authors predicting dire consequences for global trade fail to go any further, providing 
no estimates of what the actual costs might be. Although it is indeed difficult to make such estima-
tes without knowing the exact nature of the attack, it is possible to look at current trade data and 
extrapolate some of the costs of a five-day blockage. Increased shipping costs would be caused by 
additional steaming costs (fuel, crew salaries, etc.), higher insurance premiums and strain on spare 
vessel capacity.  
The length of the envisioned blockage was chosen because it is long enough to have considerable 
immediate economic consequences. At first glance these consequences may not seem so large. 
There are relatively short alternative routes that bypass the Malacca Straits. The the Straits of Lom-
bok and Makassar route, which passes through Indonesia, would only add a few days to ships’ 
journies. It would require approximately 3.5 to four days to steam the additional 2960 kilometers 
through the Lombok-Makassar Straits, assuming an average speed of 15 knots (27.6 km/h). Smaller 
ships could take the shorter detour through the shallower, more dangrous Sunda Straits.30  
 
Figure 4: Avoiding Malacca – The Straits of Lombok/Makassar and Sunda31 
 
 
Not only are the possible detours relatively short, but shipping goods or natural resources by sea is 
also extremely cost-effective. This scenario’s economic consequences for each ship, therefore, 
would not be great. The real damage results from the sheer volume of shipping that would have to 
be re-routed. The volume of shipping through the Straits has been summarized in various ways: 
65,000 ships in 2006;32 50 percent of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage and 15 percent of 
                                                     
29  Vivian Ho, “New radar system to boost Malacca Strait security near completion,” Kyodo News International 12 
June 2007. 
30  Mokhzani Zubir, “The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca,” analysis paper, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 
2004, http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/mokhzani/strategic-value.pdf (accessed 10 June 2008): 2. 
31  John H. Noer, “Southeast Asian Chokepoints: Keeping Sea Lines of Communication Open,” Institute for National 
Strategic Studies Strategic Forum 98 (December 1996): 3.  
32  Nazery Khalid, “Maintaining Security in the Strait of Malacca: A New Dawn,” paper presented at the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 6th General Conference, Jakarta, 7-8 December 2007, available 
at http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/nazery/CSCAP%202007%20_6Nov07_.pdf (accessed 16 April 
2008): 2. 
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the total value of annual world trade;33 oil at 15 million barrels per day in 2006;34 25-30% of world 
trade and 50% of global energy supplies annually;35 more than one trillion USD in goods and ser-
vices annually.36 Any way one puts it, the quantity and value of trade passing through the Straits is 
extremely high. Each ship’s additional cost if forced to take a longer route would quickly amount 
to huge losses for the global economy.  
To gain an initial glimpse of how much money an attack like this would cost shipping, it is useful 
to calculate the immediate flat cost per ship of an extra four days’ steaming. First, one must estima-
te the average shipping rates for various types of vessel. Most cargo vessels on global routes are 
contracted on a daily charter rate, commonly reported as Time Charter Equivalent (TCE). Charter 
rates fluctuate rapidly and extremely with market conditions. For example, in late 2007 average 
rates for Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC, the largest size of oil tanker) skyrocketed from USD 
20,000 per day to USD 200-300,000 per day, with even higher numbers recorded in some cases. 
The average single-voyage freight rates for 2007, which were slightly lower than in previous years, 
ranged from USD 21,800 per day for a small tanker to USD 51,000 per day for a VLCC.37 The ra-
tes for the last week in May 2008 ranged from USD 14,560 per day for a small tanker from Singa-
pore to the Far East to USD 134,119 for a VLCC from West Africa to China.38 Average rates for 
for various sizes of dry bulk carriers ranged from USD 22,600 to 43,400 in 2006; the averages for 
2007 were almost double these amounts, a drastic change from previous years.39 The huge variati-
ons in charter rates depending on ship size, voyage length and market conditions mean that any 
approximation of costs will be gross in the extreme and useful only to get a very general idea of the 
amount of money in play.  
Not only is information about VLCCs most readily available, but VLCCs are the most economical 
and therefore most preferred vessel for transporting oil long-distance from the Middle East to the 
Far East. We will therefore start with an estimate of VLCC re-routing costs. All VLCCs would be 
forced to take the longer detour through the Lombok-Makassar Straits since they are too big for the 
Sunda Straits. Taking USD 100,000 as a conservative average for current charter rates passing 
through the Malacca Straits, the cost to each charterer would be approximately USD 400,000 for 
the four extra days – a negligible amount compared to the value of the cargo or vessel.  
The costs begin to add up, however, when the number of vessels involved comes into play. 3,753 
VLCCs in the Malacca Straits were reported to Malaysia’s Marine Department Klang Vessel Traf-
fic Separation Scheme (VTS).40 If, then, an average of ten VLCCs normally pass through the Ma-
lacca Straits each day, a five-day blockage would cause about 50 rerouted VLCCs at a cost of ap-
proximately USD 20 million. For LNG carriers, the daily charter rate can be estimated at USD 
60,000.41 There were 3,413 LNG vessels reported in 2007, amounting to a five-day blockage cost 
of about USD 11.2 million. These ships would also have to take the longer route because of their 
size. Next we calculate the costs for the smaller vessels plying the intra-Asian routes that would 
reroute through the Sunda Straits. Each of these ships would only face additional costs of about 
USD 30-50,000, assuming an average TCE of USD 15-20,000, for an extra two days’ underway. 
Klang VTS recorded 14,931 smaller tanker vessels, 23,736 container ships and 3,137 Ro-Ro (Roll-
on, Roll-off) and vehicle carrier vessels in 2007. Keeping in mind that the charter rates for these 
                                                     
33  Rommel C. Banaloi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review 58 no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 
1. 
34  U.S. DoE EIA, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.”  
35  Ian Storey, “ ‘Triborder sea’ is SE Asian danger zone,” Asia Times Online, 18 October 2007, http://www. 
atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ18Ae01.html (accessed 18 March 2008). 
36  Jonathan Gardner, “Strait of Malacca off high-risk list,” Business Insurance 40 issue 33 (14 August 2006): 25. 
37  R.S. Platou Economic Research a.s, The Platou Report 2008, (Oslo: R.S. Platou Shipbrokers, 2008), http://www. 
platou.com/loadfileservlet/loadfiledb?id=1205311719484PUBLISHER&key=1205499801725 (accessed 11 June 
2008): 14. 
38  R.S. Platou Weekly Rate Assessment Week 22/2008, http://www.platou.com/EconomicResearch/Market 
Information/WeeklyFreightRates (accessed 11 June 2008).  
39  R.S. Platou, The Platou Report 2008, 19. 
40  Malaysia Marine Department, Type and Total of Vessel Report to Klang VTS, Year 2007, http://www. 
marine.gov.my/service/statistik/BKP/report_all_kapal_07.pdf (accessed 11 June 2008).  
41  U.S. Energy Information Association, The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Status and Outlook, Report no. 
DOE/EIA-0637, December 2003, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/global/lngindustry.html (accessed 11 
June 2008). 
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vessels vary enormously in reality, taking USD 20,000 per day as a gross average the total cost of a 
five-day blockage would be approximately USD 23 million. This number would likely be slightly 
higher because some of the larger non-VLCC vessels would have to use the Lombok rather than 
Sunda Straits. 
This total immediate cost of about USD 54 million represents simply the extra money shippers 
would have to pay because for five days all vessels, chartered at a fixed rate, had to take a longer 
route. The additional economic costs would be more substantial but are also even more difficult to 
estimate. After a terrorist attack charter rates would most likely skyrocket, affecting all shipping in 
the area for some time. Indeed, “the experience with the closing of the Suez Canal [during the Suez 
Crisis in 1956] seems to indicate that such a disruption [blocking Malacca] might increase freight 
rates by as much as 500 percent.”42 This number may be even higher today for some types of vessel 
because of the political and fear factors involved in a terrorist attack. Higher charter costs would 
reflect higher insurance premiums, including “hull war risks and strikes” coverage, as well as hig-
her market prices (especially of oil) caused by supply insecurity and delivery vessel scarcity.   
In 2005, when the Joint War Committee of the Lloyd’s Market Association added the Strait of Ma-
lacca to its Hull, War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas, the market placed a sur-
charge equal to 0.01 percent of the value of the vessel, per trip, on ships using the Strait.43 A year 
later Lloyd’s removed the Strait from the list, but it is reasonable to assume that if a terrorist attack 
did occur a surcharge of at least the same percentage, possibly more, would be re-imposed. For e-
xample, a normal hull insurance policy varies between 2.5 percent and 3.75 percent of a tanker’s 
value on an annualized basis. “Thus, a tanker owner operating a $130 million VLCC can expect to 
pay $8,900-$13,300 a day in insurance costs.” Because premiums for perilous zones “can climb to 
7.5 percent to 10 percent of a ship’s value on a per-trip basis,” the same VLCC operator would face 
“between $8.9 [sic] and $13.3 million per trip to insure his ship while it was in the danger zone.”44 
An actual terrorist attack would confirm the area’s high danger risk and likely push premiums to-
ward the top end of this range. Given the huge volume of trade going through the Straits these pre-
miums would heavily impact shipping and, eventually, the entire global economy. 
The other major factor that would drive up shipping costs would be the shortage of available extra 
vessels.45 If the blockage lasted for some time, shipping rates would quickly rise as each vessel 
spent more days at sea hauling one cargo load a longer distance than usual. If Malacca were blo-
cked for only four days, for example, China would need an extra “40 VLCC’s worth of spare tan-
ker capacity.”46 There are only about 500 VLCCs in the world; the fleet has very little spare capaci-
ty. However, most of the oil-dependent countries in East Asia have strategic reserves and would 
not suffer too badly from a short supply delay. Even China is building a 30-day strategic reserve. 
Other less time-crucial commodities such as automobiles and textiles would also not suffer much, 
only incurring some extra costs for longer holding times. Nonetheless, the simple fear of another 
attack or supply shortages would probably be enough to drive prices up. Even if rates rose no 
further than the peak 2007 prices of USD 300,000 for VLCCs and LNG carriers and USD 100,000 
for smaller vessels, prolonged periods at these inflated rates would mean significant additional 
costs to operators (and therefore customers).  
Another cost would be if a cruise ship were attacked, which would kill the cruise/tourist industry in 
the area. This would affect the local economy more than the global, but it would have huge global 
political implications since most tourists in the Straits come from Western countries.  
 
                                                     
42  Noer, 2.   
43  Keith Bradsher, “Terror fears put squeeze on ships in Asian strait,” International Herald Tribune, 25 August 2005, 
www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/24/business/ships.php (accessed 17 April 2008).  
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(Spring 2008): 85-86. It appears, however, that Collins and Murray made a mathematical error in their calculations, 
as 7.5 percent of 130 million is 9.75 million, not 8.9 million. The other calculations appear correct. 
45  See Jad Mouawad, “A Tanker Shortage contributes to Rising Oil Costs,” New York Times late edition, 20 October 
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4.2 People’s Republic of China 
 
China’s interests in the Malacca Straits can be divided into two general paths: strategic and eco-
nomic. The first path indicates China’s concern that in case of crisis or war its energy supply lines 
will be cut off, the second its desire to keep the Straits open to all trade at all times. A blockage of 
the Malacca Straits would severely damage both types of interest. 
China’s strategic interests in the Straits are longstanding but have intensified and attracted more 
attention since its incredible economic success caused increasing dependence on oil imported from 
the Middle East. PRC President Hu Jintao first introduced the “Malacca Dilemma” concept in late 
2003. The dilemma essentially describes Beijing’s concern that if the Malacca Straits or certain 
other Southeast Asian SLOCs were blocked, China would suffer severe trade and energy supply 
disruptions. China’s dependence on the Malacca Straits for energy supply is remarkably deep. 
About 80 percent of Chinese oil imports pass through the Straits; in 2006 Chinese imports from 
countries in the Middle East totalled almost USD 40 billion.47 Any downturn in energy supply 
frightens the PRC leadership in Beijing, since it would likely bring “massive unemployment, social 
unrest, and antigovernment protests”48 that “could derail the economic growth on which the Chi-
nese government depends to shore-up its legitimacy and pursue its great power ambitions.”49 Bei-
jing believes that if a crisis arose in Southeast Asia due to a terrorist attack or outbreak of war (for 
example a blowup across the Taiwan Strait), “a continuing lack of a Chinese strategic presence in 
the Malacca region could swiftly become an area of vulnerability.”50 The PRC’s naval capabilities 
are still far from what is required to unilaterally protect its energy supply lines.51 China must rely 
on other nations’ navies, especially the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, to maintain security in the 
Straits.52 The strategic weakness of such reliance is obvious.  
Chinese officials and experts tend to focus heavily on the war rather than terrorism scenario. They 
consider war more likely given existing tensions over Taiwan, the South China Sea and regional 
influence. The Malacca Dilemma therefore primarily describes a war scenario in which a foreign 
(read: American) military power blocks Chinese access to the Straits. While the considerations re-
garding war have no relevance for this paper’s scenario, because the terrorist attack would also 
block the Straits and affect China’s energy supply many of the issues and concerns encompassed 
by the Malacca Dilemma also apply here. The Malacca Dilemma moreover illustrates how highly 
China rates the Straits’ importance. 
Beijing is currently addressing the Malacca Dilemma from a number of angles. It is trying to diver-
sify its energy supply by securing oil from countries outside the Middle East, investigating alterna-
tive shipping routes for oil coming from the Middle East, helping maintain security in the Malacca 
Straits, looking into more efficient or alternative energy options like LNG, and modernizing the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to be able to protect its own supply lines in the future.53 
China would like to import more oil from countries like Indonesia, Venezuela and the Central 
Asian republics. Possibilities for bypassing the Malacca Straits include a pipeline through Burma to 
Yunnan province in southwestern China, a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand and railroads 
or pipelines from Russia and Central Asia. The PLAN is trying to develop a blue-water navy capa-
ble of extended deployments far from the Chinese coast. Each of these possible solutions to the 
Malacca Dilemma, however, is rife with political and technical difficulties. With the exception of 
some measures contributing to security in the Straits they are also all very long-term. None will 
greatly decrease China’s dependence on the Malacca Straits within the next five years. Beijing is 
building a 30-day strategic petroleum reserve and calling for larger commercial stocks so it can 
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endure short supply disruptions. This strategic reserve will certainly lessen China’s immediate Ma-
lacca Dilemma somewhat, but will not provide a long-term solution. The PRC thus has and will 
continue to have significant security interests in the Malacca Straits for some time.  
China also has large commercial interests in the Malacca Straits in addition to its strategic oil con-
cerns. For example, China is heavily involved in the dry bulk trade, particularly in iron ore, steel 
products and coal. China was the main exporter of steel in 2006, with the USA, Europe and the 
Middle East as the primary importers.54 Virtually all of Chinese trade with Europe, the Middle East 
and Africa passes through the Straits, as does a good deal of its trade with India, Brazil and the east 
coast of the United States.55 Some trade, mostly lightweight or urgently needed cargo, travels by air 
but the vast majority is sent by ship. Almost everything that does travel by ship transits the Malacca 
Straits. In 2006 Chinese trade with Europe, the Middle East and Africa totalled USD 1.46 trillion.56 
The USD 40 billion in oil imports from the Middle East for that year almost pales in comparison to 
this volume of trade. Furthermore, Chinese nationals frequently conduct business with overseas 
Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia.  
The combined influence of the strategic energy security and trade factors means the consequences 
of this paper’s attack scenario for China would be extreme. In the worse case, the blockage of the 
Straits would disrupt not only energy supplies but also commercial trade to such a degree that do-
mestic confidence in the PRC government plummeted and the leadership’s legitimacy became jeo-
poardized. It should be noted that this is an extremely unlikely outcome since China is building its 
30-day petroleum reserve and the envisioned blockage would only last five days. Still, continued 
discussion of the Malacca Dilemma indicates that Beijing gives a good amount of weight to such 
worst-case scenarios. The high consequences apparently outweigh the low probability of occur-
rence. Moreover, even if the government’s leadership remained secure the longer-term commercial 
consequences caused by inflated shipping rates would strongly impact Chinese trade. Beijing is 
“hypersensitive to any factors which may disrupt its growing need for regional and cross-regional 
trade.”57 Shippers would have to deal with the costs discussed in Section 4.1 above. These costs 
could possibly encourage multinational corporations to relocate some parts of their production 
chain closer to home to reduce outlay – in a reversal of the trends that led these companies to China 
in the first place. These decisions would depend on how long the higher shipping costs last.   
These considerations mean China wants the Malacca Straits to stay open and safe at all times. They 
provide an enormous incentive for China to contribute to improving security in the Straits. Its con-
cern with keeping trade open in peacetime and the Malacca-area SLOCs open in wartime means 
Beijing is very willing to help maintain security in the Straits at all times. 
 
 
4.3 European Union 
 
The European Union’s interests in the Malacca Straits are, unlike the other two actors’, overwhelm-
ingly economic. As mentioned above, almost all EU trade with China passes through the Straits – 
and China is the EU’s second-largest trade partner, after only the USA. The EU imports more from 
China than from the United States. Almost all EU-East Asia non-airborne trade passes through the 
Malacca Straits. For example, every single shipping route from Europe to East Asia offered by 
Maersk Shipping, one of the largest container shipping companies in the world, passes through the 
Malacca Straits. Hence more than 26 percent of EU merchandise trade, or the equivalent of about 
EUR 3.8 trillion, probably passed through the Malacca Straits in 2006. A blockage caused by a ter-
rorist attack would wreak havoc on this trade. For example, China and Japan are the EU’s third and 
fourth largest import partners, respectively. A blockage of the Malacca Straits would virtually cut 
off the EU’s trade with two of its largest suppliers. Moreover, because Singapore is the EU’s 
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eighth-largest trading partner, with Malaysia and Indonesia at numbers 13 and 20, respectively, an 
attack in the Malacca Straits would harm the EU by devastating some of its major trade partners. 58  
A further EU economic interest in the Malacca Straits is driven by European investment in the re-
gion. EU shipowners account for almost ten percent of all freight transiting the Malacca Straits. EU 
energy companies are heavily involved in oil exploration in Southeast Asia. European arms firms 
provide significant amounts of armaments and training to the littoral states. For example, in 2005 
Singapore hired a Danish company (among others) to build its new Anti-Terror Center.59 These 
economic interests provide a strong incentive for the EU to work for unfettered, safe shipping in 
the Malacca Straits.  
The EU also has some security interests in the Malacca Straits, mostly centering on its concern 
about global terrorism and its prioritization of international maritime security, which produce a 
strong interest in maintaining security in the Malacca Straits. The European Commission’s com-
munication A new partnership with South-East Asia, published in 2003, listed fighting terrorism as 
a top priority in its work with the region.60 In early 2006 then-EU anti-terrorism coordinator, Gijs 
de Vries, said that although the number of acts of piracy in the Straits has decreased, the area is still 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks: “I think no one is under any illusion: the Straits are a potential tar-
get.”61 Even before 11 September 2001 the European Commission made the security of sea trans-
port a priority, not only in European waters but globally. This includes, of course, shipping through 
the Malacca Straits.  
Moreover, a few EU member states have particularly strong security interests in Southeast Asia 
that encompass the Malacca Straits. Great Britain and France both have military presences in the 
region and have made (non-binding) security commitments to some Southeast Asian countries, in-
cluding Singapore and Malaysia.62 Great Britain is a member of the Five Power Defense Arrange-
ment, a military alliance with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. France even sent a 
warship on patrols through the Malacca Straits, with Singapore’s permission.63 Germany, although 
it does not have any direct security concerns in the region, has worked to promote regional confi-
dence building, conflict prevention and cooperation. The German military conducts training pro-
grams with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and the Philippines. All of this military in-
volvement has a marine component and therefore relies on secure passage through the Malacca 
Straits, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the countries concerned.  
Because it is not as politically active in Southeast Asia as the other two external actors, and because 
its member states have hardly any military presence in the region, the European Union has shown 
less direct interest in the Malacca Straits than have the U.S. or China. However, as discussed above 
the Union does have significant economic interests as well as some security concerns that produce 
quite a large overall interest in keeping the Straits secure and open to shipping traffic.  
 
 
4.4 United States 
 
Since the vast majority of China-U.S. trade travels across the Pacific Ocean and therefore does not 
rely on the Malacca Strait, the U.S. has slightly different interests in the Straits than the EU or 
China. These interests focus primarily on the United States’ perceived need to maintain military 
superiority in the region, including naval preeminence in the Malacca Straits. The U.S. also has an 
interest in its major trade partners’ continued economic health. Taking this second item first, even 
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though most of the cargo traveling to or from U.S. shores does not actually pass through the Straits, 
the USA would still be economically affected by a blockage of the Malacca Straits. If China, Japan, 
South Korea and the EU – all top-ten U.S. trade partners – suffered from a blockage, the U.S. econ-
omy would also feel the impact. Even in 1996, U.S. analysts recognized this fact. John H. Noer of 
the Institute for National Strategic Studies put it succinctly: “Japan, Australia, and the nations of 
Southeast Asia send over 40 percent of their trade through these narrow waterways [the Malacca 
Straits and the SLOCs through the South China Sea]. Their economic vitality depends on free 
access to these sea lanes. U.S. prosperity in turn relies on the economic health of our trade part-
ners.”64 Though the facts are slightly outdated – China has certainly by now earned a place on the 
list of important U.S. trade partners – the concept remains true. The U.S. would also be affected by 
the higher shipping rates caused by increased insurance premiums and vessel shortages. Finally, 
since the blockage would disrupt the flow of oil as discussed above, global oil prices might rise 
even higher than their current record prices. 
From a regional security standpoint the U.S. has even stronger interests in the Malacca Straits. 
These interests are twofold: first, the U.S. wants to maintain its traditional military superiority in 
Southeast Asia for various geo-political and geo-strategic reasons that go beyond the scope of this 
paper. Sufficient here is that they do want to keep a strong presence in the region, which is already 
large at 200 ships (including six aircraft carriers on standby) and 250,000 soldiers. A Congressional 
Research Service expert on Southeast Asia, Bruce Vaughn, points out the “United States’ relative 
lack of attention to Asia” compared to the Middle East and cites a report by the East-West Institute 
that “Washington must actively re-engage if it is to maintain its influence.”65 Addressing this same 
perception, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates  spent much of his speech to the 2008 Shangri-
La Dialogue, the foremost Track II dialogue on East Asian security held each year in Singapore, 
arguing for a continued strong U.S. military presence in the region. He said, “For the last 60 years, 
America has added consistent value to the Asian security equation. That remains a reality today just 
as it has been in the past. The security of all Asian countries – whether large or small – is strongly 
and positively enhanced by a strong U.S. presence.”66 A book published by National Defense Uni-
versity includes at least three chapters arguing for a strong United States naval presence in South-
east Asia as part of the new U.S. defense strategy. These chapters all support a U.S. role as the be-
nevolent hegemon maintaining stability in the region.67 One vital component of this presence is 
U.S. Navy access to Changi naval base in Singapore, the only base in the region equipped to ac-
commodate the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and other large vessels of the 7th Fleet. For some ana-
lysts, uninhibited access through the Indonesian archipelago, including the Malacca Straits, “is of 
vital national security importance for the United States.”68 Such general agreement on the impor-
tance of a strong U.S. military presence in East/Southeast Asia, combined with the more specific 
recommendations for uninhibited access through the Malacca Straits, indicates an extremely strong 
U.S. security interest in the Straits even without the terrorism factor.  
Second, the U.S. wants to pursue the global war on terror in Southeast Asia. After 9/11 the Bush 
administration dubbed Southeast Asia the “second front” in the war on terror. The U.S. Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in its Country Reports on Terrorism of April 2007, praised 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia for their successful cooperation to increase security in the wa-
terway. While these littoral states are primarily concerned with using these measures to combat 
piracy and armed robbery in the Straits the U.S. emphasis lies clearly on terrorism. For example the 
Country Reports on Terrorism states, “The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre (ISC) continued 
its operations, connecting 14 governments in Asia to enhance piracy-related information sharing.”69 
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The State Department’s decision to mention a maritime security regime that specifically targets 
piracy and armed robbery in its report on global terrorism indicates not only an overwhelming con-
cern with terrorism above other considerations but also a confluence of piracy and terrorism within 
U.S. governmental thinking. The available literature indicates that U.S. experts and governmental 
officials take the Malacca terrorist attack scenario quite seriously, widely accepting it as a real 
threat to U.S. security. By contrast European and Chinese analysts tend to prioritize other concerns 
regarding the Straits, such as trade or environmental protection.  
Finally, the U.S. would suffer additionally if the terrorist attack were on a cruise ship as discussed 
above. Cruises are not a necessary part of life. As a luxury item, if cruise vacations were marred 
even once by being a target of terrorism, “the industry will be in big trouble. People just won’t sail 
any more – either with the company owning the vessel or with one of its [few] competitors.”70 
Those companies operating in the Malacca Straits would obviously be hardest hit, but a general 
fear of cruises caused by a terrorist attack and the subsequent (highly probable) media frenzy 
would affect cruise lines all over the world, including Europe and the United States.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
All three external actors would suffer considerably from a terrorist attack that blocked the Malacca 
Straits. All three would face economic problems as shipping rates and therefore the costs of trade 
increased – China and the EU more so than the United States, although the U.S. would be hit by the 
repercussions of its trade partners’ suffering. In addition, each actor would encounter problems 
specific to its situation. The U.S. is primarily concerned about regional military influence and ter-
rorism, the EU about trade and some security interests, and China about energy security and trade. 
Although the actors prioritize different aspects of security, they all do have significant interests in 
keeping the Straits safe and open – especially from such an attack that would impact all of the in-
terests listed above. Given these strong interests in the waterway and the possible consequences of 
a terrorist attack, it would behoove the actors to increase their efforts to improve security in the 
Straits. Also given the virtual impossibility of acting unilaterally in foreign waters as well as all 
three actors’ recent rhetorical emphasis on the importance of multilateral cooperation to address the 
challenges of today’s world, working together either trilaterally or multilaterally is the best avail-
able option. Such cooperation is the focus of the next section. 
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5. Cooperation and Competition 
 
Divided into three parts, this section first examines each external actor’s interests in cooperating 
either bilaterally or multilaterally on security in Southeast Asia (not necessarily the Malacca Straits 
specifically). It then discusses the measures already in place to improve security in the Straits and 
concludes with an overview of past and current counter-terrorism cooperation between the relevant 
actors. Some of the external actors’ interests in cooperation are motivated by factors not directly 
related to the Malacca Straits but which nevertheless create impulses for Straits-relevant or Straits-
centered cooperation. In terms of actual cooperation efforts, the littoral states are extremely jealous 
of their national sovereignty and sensitive to any actions that might impinge upon it. The external 
actors have therefore to date played only a limited role in securing the Malacca Straits. Moreover, 
differences of opinion regarding terrorism and how to fight it have led to problems in cooperation, 
or even to non-cooperation. Despite these difficulties, some progress has been made toward forging 
structures for security cooperation. These successes form the basis upon which the external actors 
should build further cooperation. They mark the means and methods acceptable to all parties for 
improving maritime security and countering terrorism and thus indicate where multilateral security 
cooperation in the Malacca Straits may be grown, if carefully nurtured. The second and third parts 
of this section therefore not only discuss current cooperation but also highlight opportunities to ex-
pand or add to it. This paper’s terrorist attack scenario brings together the actors’ concerns about 
maintaining unrestricted shipping, the attack’s and blockage’s consequences for each actor, and 
their individual interests in cooperation. The scenario highlights the fact that the actors would bene-
fit more from cooperation than from acting alone. It could and should therefore catalyze much 
deeper, more extensive cooperation than currently exists. 
 
 
5.1.  Interests in Cooperation 
 
In addition to their interests in keeping the Malacca Straits open to functioning shipping traffic, the 
external actors also have interests in bilateral or multilateral cooperation that may be determined by 
factors unrelated to shipping traffic, the safety of sea lanes, or even terrorism. These interests 
should further motivate the actors to cooperate on Malacca Straits security issues.  
As China expert Marc Lanteigne points out, China would be much better served by cooperating to 
solve its Malacca Dilemma than by acting unilaterally.  
“Beijing’s and others’ interests would be far better served by the employment of a multilateral approach to main-
taining the Straits as a safe passageway for all lawful trade, developing alternative regional trading routes for its 
maritime cargo, and encouraging confidence-building initiatives among regional actors concerned about the water-
ways’ economic security.”71  
Multilateral cooperation would prevent backlashes from both ASEAN states concerned that China 
might be attempting to become a regional hegemon and a United States trying to maintain its own 
regional influence and possibly contain Chinese expansion. To protect its interests in the Malacca 
Straits the P.R.C. has been modernizing its military but at the same time conducting careful diplo-
macy in the hopes of preventing an arms race. One way to secure the Straits and also prevent zero-
sum mentalities that might lead to balancing or competitive armaments acquisitions is multilateral 
cooperation.  
A further motivation for China to cooperate is a positive, political one. Cooperation would open a 
door for China to further pursue its current policy of engaging ASEAN states and demonstrating its 
own good intentions. China could not only deepen its current dialogue with ASEAN on security 
issues but also provide services such as training and information exchange. As a bonus China 
would probably be able to use this cooperation to increase not only its political and economic but 
also its military influence and presence in the region, something it has been trying to do for some 
time.72 Finally, China would learn quite a bit in terms of technical expertise by cooperating with the 
other two external actors to teach the littoral states how to improve their security capabilities in the 
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Malacca Straits. These considerations should push Beijing towards multilateral cooperation rather 
than unilateral action to secure its interests in the Straits. 
Cooperation on security in the Straits is in keeping with the EU’s general interest in expanding its 
influence as a global actor. The EU has recently developed a goal of becoming not only an eco-
nomic powerhouse but also a global security actor, as its attempts to formulate a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy as well as a European Security and Defence Policy attest. Some analysts argue 
that naval capabilities are some of the easiest to introduce into a new theater of operations;73 mari-
time security in the Malacca Straits would thus be a nice first step for the EU to become more in-
volved in Southeast Asian security. Although this goal does not represent direct EU interests in the 
Malacca Straits, it nonetheless provides a strong impetus for the EU to cooperate to increase secu-
rity there. 
The EU’s general policy of promoting multilateral cooperation also pushes it toward cooperation in 
this paper’s scenario. The European Commission policy paper on Southeast Asia, published in 
2003, lists supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism as the first of six strategic 
priorities for the region. The “action points” designed to implement this strategic priority are con-
ducting political dialogue in multilateral fora and cooperating in the fight against terrorism.74 The 
overall EU focus on multilateralism and cooperation thus, as might be expected, also covers coun-
terterrorism activities. Reflecting this EU perspective former EU counterterrorism coordinator Gijs 
de Vries commented, “It’s essential that we combine our forces to combat this threat. Terrorism is a 
threat to human lives. It is also a threat to economic development.” Because terrorism is a global 
problem affecting all countries and all societies, they must cooperate to address the problem. De 
Vries hence argued for further, strengthened regional cooperation to combat terrorism in the Ma-
lacca Straits.75 The EU similarly emphasizes cooperation to increase maritime security, not only 
due to its general policy of encouraging multilateralism but also because maritime security, like 
terrorism, simply cannot be addressed by one state alone. Current EU cooperation partners in im-
proving maritime security include, among others, both the United States and China.76 The EU thus 
has significant interests in – even an established policy of – cooperation on both counterterrorism 
and improving maritime security that should motivate it to actively encourage multilateral coopera-
tion on these issues in the Malacca Straits. 
U.S. interests in cooperation follow similar lines as some of China’s: as U.S. resources are increas-
ingly thinly stretched due to the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan multilateral cooperation will 
become more and more attractive. The U.S. cannot possibly ensure maritime security all over the 
globe. It does not have the ships, manpower or other resources to do so. It thus has a strong interest 
in cooperation to achieve those security goals it cannot reach by itself. Moreover, as with China 
multilateral cooperation would assuage local states’ and other powers’ concerns about American 
hegemony and unilateralism. Recent increases in cooperation-focused rhetoric from Washington 
indicate the U.S. government has reached similar concludsions and decided cooperation is in its 
interests. The title of the naval services’ most recent strategy paper, “A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Sea Power,” at least indicates Washington’s intention to increase cooperation on mari-
time security – though critics have argued the strategy in reality says nothing new. Still, the docu-
ment was produced with consultation from as many different maritime actors as possible, including 
merchants and some international actors. It makes continual references to the importance of col-
laboration. Some inside the Navy and White House are also arguing for ratification of UNCLOS, 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on which many of the international efforts for maritime 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia are based.77 By demonstrating its willingness to cooperate 
on security issues in Southeast Asia through multilateral cooperation to ensure security in the Ma-
lacca Straits, the U.S. would regain some of the reputation it has lost in recent years. 
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In sum, not only would each actor individually benefit from improved security in the Malacca 
Straits but each would also profit from trilateral or multilateral cooperation on these issues. Despite 
some tensions caused by power rivalries between the U.S. and China and among the littoral states, 
working for security in the Malacca Straits is a relatively uncontroversial issue. All actors – the 
three external actors and other Straits user states as well as the littoral states – agree that increased 
security for shipping traffic in the Straits is necessary. This paper’s scenario should therefore pro-
vide an impulse for further, deeper multilateral cooperation to provide this security. Working to-
gether on this comparatively agreed-on topic would be a good way for the six relevant actors to 
ease into multilateral cooperation, since they are not used to working with each other and remain 
somewhat suspicious of one another’s intentions.  
 
 
5.2  Efforts to Improve Security in the Straits 
 
This overview of the existing mechanisms for maintaining and improving security in the Malacca 
Straits highlights those efforts with the potential to support deeper, closer multilateral cooperation. 
Focusing on these opportunities, it indicates where the three external stakeholders can work to-
gether to engage the littoral states in security cooperation.  
 
5.2.1 Local Efforts 
 
The three littoral states have long cooperated bilaterally to patrol the Malacca Straits. Since 2004 
they have considerably increased trilateral cooperation as well. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
introduced a coordinated patrol system, MALSINDO, in July 2004. This initiative, intentionally 
restricted in scope to avoid problems regarding national sovereignty, consists of each state’s force 
patrolling within its own waters. Forces are not allowed to cross national boundaries even when in 
hot pursuit of a target. Instead, they communicate with the other littoral states’ patrols and hand off 
responsibility for the pursuit at the border. An additional initiative, the “Eyes in the Sky” program 
entailing combined air marine patrols, began in September 2005. This program allows on-duty air-
craft to cross national boundaries. The three littoral states rotate patrols, with a foreign liason offi-
cer on board at all times to monitor the goings-on over his or her national territory. The program is 
only for surveillance. It does not allow aircraft to aid in pursuing or apprehending targets. This sur-
veillance-only mandate as well as the program’s presence only in the air rather than on the surface 
works to mitigate any sovereignty-related tensions.78  
A possible local platform for multilateral security cooperation in the Straits is the new command 
and control center under construction near Singapore’s Changi naval base. The Changi Command 
and Control (C2) Centre will contain the Singapore Maritime Security Centre, the Information Fu-
sion Centre and the Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC). The MOEC will “be 
able to support the planning and conduct of bilateral and multilateral exercises or operations.” It 
will facilitate multilateral exercises as well as regional maritime security operations and provide 
humanitarian assistance or disaster relief should the need arise.79 Expected to become operational 
in 2009, this center could provide the logistical support necessary for close multilateral security 
cooperation. 
 
5.2.2  Regional Efforts 
 
The only regional mechanism specifically for maritime security, ReCAAP, came into force in Sep-
tember 2006. Parties to the agreement include the ten ASEAN countries plus Bangladesh, China, 
India, Japan, South Korea and Sri Lanka. The initiative’s Information Sharing Center (ISC), based 
in Singapore, collects information provided by a designated Focal Point in each country (for exam-
ple, a contact within the country’s Coast Guard, Marine Police, Navy etc.). Each focal point han-
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dles any piracy or armed robbery incidents within its territorial waters; exchanges information with 
the ISC; facilitates investigations of any crimes within its jurisdiction; and coordinates with 
neighboring focal points on all issues relating to piracy and armed robbery. ReCAAP also includes 
capacity-building activities such as joint exercises and training workshops. It has brought the mem-
ber countries together in closer security cooperation than ever before. However, it is still only a 
mechanism for information exchange and coordination. It has no operational role in helping catch 
criminals or prevent attacks. Moreover, the fact that neither Indonesia nor Malaysia has ratified the 
Agreement renders the entire program somewhat useless. ReCAAP cannot cover major interna-
tional waterways such as the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits because large parts of these wa-
ters belong to one of the two nations. Both states’ resistance to ratification has been attributed to 
the ISC’s location in Singapore, which in turn indicates ongoing competition among the littoral 
states as well as concerns over sovereignty.80 Moreover, the U.S. and EU are not participating 
states. Finally, ReCAAP has no provisions for maritime terrorism. These last two considerations 
make this initiative, for the time being, largely irrelevant for this paper’s purposes. However, as 
Joshua Ho argues in his recent article on ReCAAP, the program could become the basis for re-
gional cooperation against maritime terrorism precisely because it has “a regional network of focal 
points already established.”81 If the above difficulties can be overcome, ReCAAP could make great 
contributions to multilateral security cooperation on maritime terrorism in the Malacca Straits. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only regional organization in which the U.S., EU and 
China all participate. Although many analysts (and many politicians, though they do not say so) 
agree the ARF is largely a “talk shop-photo op” forum and nothing more, maritime security is one 
exception to this general rule. In March 2005, for example, Singapore and the United States co-
hosted an ARF confidence-building exercise entitled “Regional Cooperation in Maritime Security.” 
Twenty-four participants joined in the exercise, including Malaysia, Indonesia, the EU and China 
in addition to the two hosts. The meeting sought to identify “concrete ‘solution sets’ through focu-
sed discussion in four key areas: multilateral cooperation, operational solutions to maritime securi-
ty, shipping and port security and applicable technology for maritime security.”82 In January 2007 a 
total of 21 out of 26 ARF members, including the six important for this paper, participated in their 
first shore-based simulated maritime security exercise. This was the first concrete military exercise 
conducted by the ARF. Held in Singapore, the simulation involved locating a vessel that had gone 
missing. The exercise aimed to improve international and inter-agency information sharing.83 The 
forum is planning further capacity-building exercises for maritime security, focusing on disaster 
relief, in 2008 and 2009.84 The ARF may thus be an excellent platform for the three external to 
cooperate in response to this paper’s scenario, since it not only has proven itself open to multinati-
onal cooperation on maritime security but also includes all three actors in its membership. How-
ever, cooperation would need to be stepped up from the current dialogue and consensus building to 
an operational level. 
 
5.2.3. International Efforts 
 
One international cooperation initiative has recently made great headway. The “Co-operative 
Mechanism” for enhancing navigational safety, security and environmental protection in the Ma-
lacca and Singapore Straits was agreed in September 2007 after more than two years of meetings, 
dialogues and negotiations. Engendered by the International Maritime Organization’s push to pro-
tect major international waterways, the Co-operation Mechanism provides 1) a forum for regular 
dialogue between littoral states, user states and individual users of the Straits; 2) a committee to 
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coordinate and manage six designated joint projects on navigational security; and 3) an Aids to 
Navigation Fund to accept and manage voluntary monetary contributions for the upkeep of naviga-
tion aids in the Straits.85 It is “a first in terms of the operationalisation of Article 43 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”86 The Convention, or UNCLOS, is the most compre-
hensive international maritime regime to date. It specifies the rights and duties of littoral versus 
user states on issues such as rights of passage, navigational safety and pollution. The Aids to Navi-
gation voluntary fund was a tricky issue and represents a compromise between the littoral states 
and international shipping. The littoral states, most vocally Malaysia, have long been calling for 
users transiting the Straits to pay a small fee to help finance the maintenance of the shipping lane in 
the Straits. The shipping industry was concerned that if transit fees were established for the Ma-
lacca Straits then similar measures would be introduced in other major waterways such as the Suez 
and Panama Canals or the Strait of Hormuz. Such fees would amount to a significant rise in the 
cost of shipping. The Aids to Navigation Fund is therefore voluntary. A giant step forward in terms 
of maritime security cooperation, the Co-operative Mechanism will contribute greatly to maintain-
ing navigational and environmental security in the Straits. It does not, however, address terrorism. 
While the Mechanism may provide a channel for communication between user and littoral states in 
the future, maritime counterterrorism cooperation does not appear to be in the cards.87 
Another international regime also promoted by the IMO, the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code, was introduced in December 2002. It does not specifically target the Malacca Straits 
but its provisions do affect security there. The Code aims “to provide a standardized framework to 
assess security risks to ships and ports and to systematically reduce vulnerabilities.”88 It requires all 
contracting parties to conduct risk assessments of their port facilities, set security levels (i.e., rate 
how much risk exists) and corresponding security measures, and bring all ships into compliance 
with the minimum-security standards set by the IMO. However, these measures only apply to pas-
senger and cargo ships of 500 tons or more that are sailing internationally and to the port facilities 
servicing these vessels. It does not cover smaller ships or ports.89 Nonetheless, bringing all quali-
fied ports in the Malacca Straits into accordance with the code would be a great step in improving 
security – especially the security of the larger international ports and vessels in which the EU, U.S. 
and China have stakes. 
Other major efforts to improve maritime security include the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), both introduced by the United States. Wash-
ington’s intent for these initiatives clearly reflects its perception of terrorism as the largest threat 
currently in existence. The PSI aims to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction by rec-
ommending that participating states interdict any suspicious ships in their territorial waters. The 
PSI assiduously recommends rather than requires; the “activity” is non-binding. Participating states 
need not take any action, only seriously consider doing so. The PSI “attempts to promote multilat-
eral cooperation without a cumbersome treaty apparatus” and was for all intents and purposes sanc-
tioned by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to take meas-
ures against proliferation.90 The PSI was designed to allay concerns about U.S. heavy-handedness, 
carefully emphasizing its voluntary and multilateral nature. The RMSI began similarly. When he 
first introduced the initiative, which failed, U.S. Pacific Command Commander Admiral Timothy 
Fargo described it as  
“a partnership of willing regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept 
transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws. This collective effort will empower 
each participating nation with the timely information and capabilities it needs to act against maritime threats in its 
own territorial seas. As always, each nation will have to decide for itself what response, if any, it will take in its 
own waters. Information sharing will also contribute to the security of international seas, creating an environment 
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hostile to terrorism and other criminal activities. Any RMSI activity in international waters will, again, be in accor-
dance with existing international law.”91 
Despite U.S. attempts to ease other states’ concerns, a significant number of Asian countries hesi-
tated to join these initiatives due to concerns over their implications for state sovereignty. Some 
states, such as China, also felt threatened by the United States’ leading role. Indeed, the RMSI 
failed because the media incorrectly reported that Admiral Fargo had testified to Congress that U.S. 
Special Forces and Marines would patrol the Malacca Straits in high-speed vessels. This claim was 
unfounded and untrue. As the above quote illustrates the RMSI was carefully crafted and presented 
as neutrally and multilaterally as possible. Its creators deliberately incorporated respect for national 
sovereignty. Yet the media reports scared off the politically sensitive Asian countries and ulti-
mately led to the RMSI’s downfall. Both Indonesian and Malaysian leaders “immediately blasted” 
the initiative, “condemn[ing] the proposed deployment of U.S. forces in the strait as a direct affront 
to their sovereignty.” 92 Beijing feared the initiative might be intended to contain Chinese regional 
influence but did not voice these concerns.93 China and Indonesia have rejected the PSI for the 
same reasons, even though Washington also deliberately made it as legal (i.e. in accordance with 
UN conventions) and neutral as possible.94 Today only Singapore and most EU states participate in 
the PSI; Malaysia, Indonesia and China still do not.95  
The relative failure of externally sponsored initiatives to improve security in the Malacca Straits led 
Major Victor Huang, in his excellent analysis of maritime security in Southeast Asia, to three con-
clusions. First, “ambitious attempts at regime building by extraregional powers are unlikely to suc-
ceed, because of major-power rivalries” such as between the U.S. and China. The rivalry causes 
regional states to remain unaligned, not wanting to displease either great power. Second, “offers of 
external operational assistance run up against sovereignty concerns related to direct intervention by 
foreign powers,” as happened to the RMSI and PSI. Externally mooted initiatives do not have the 
same promise of success as locally sponsored ones precisely because they are often perceived as 
attempts by external powers trying to impose their wills on the littoral states. Third, “there is evi-
dence of a strong desire to preserve the status quo under existing international law and of resistance 
to new precedents that might compromise future actions or negotiations.” Indonesia in particular 
regards itself as a regional power and is unwilling to give up any of the freedom of movement that 
joining a maritime security regime might require.96 The EU, U.S. and China find themselves stuck 
within this quite hostile environment, having many economic as well as security interests in the 
Malacca Straits but unwelcome by the littoral states in any real security cooperation. After discuss-
ing the actors’ cooperation on counterterrorism issues this paper returns to this issue, exploring the 
ways the three external actors might contribute to security in the Straits with minimal resistance 
from the littoral states. 
 
 
5.3  Counterterrorism Strategies and Cooperation 
 
Both bilateral and multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism is only minimal, comprising infor-
mation exchange, best practice sharing and mutual agreements on security practices. Inter-regional 
dialogues like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and ARF, while far more expansive and in-depth 
than previously, are still just dialogues. Little concrete cooperation has occurred. Nonetheless, an 
examination of the six actors’ current counterterrorism strategies and cooperation reveals a surpris-
ing number of confluences of preferences and approaches behind the tension. These common ap-
proaches and their consequent successful cooperation activities should be fully exploited. They 
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should be built on, expanded and deepened into full-fledged multilateral cooperation on maritime 
security, including counterterrorism, in the Malacca Straits.  
 
5.3.1  United States-Southeast Asia 
 
United States policy toward Southeast Asia has, like much of its policy elsewhere in the world, 
centered on counterterrorism. Washington has run into some trouble in the ASEAN region because 
of states’ unwillingness to subsume their counterterrorism efforts under the U.S. global war on ter-
ror. They are afraid that not only would cooperation with the U.S. allow Washington room to inter-
fere in their internal affairs but also that their domestic populations would protest, since “their pub-
lics feel that the ‘War on Terrorism’ is in fact a war against Islam.”97 The most recent U.S. Na-
tional Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released in February 2006, makes a clear effort to as-
suage such fears by separating terrorist-exploited Islam from other Islam. It states that terrorists 
aim to establish regimes that “rule according to a violent and intolerant distortion of Islam,” that 
Islam “has been twisted and made to serve an evil end.”98 Yet such language has proven unsuccess-
ful in swaying public opinion in some Southeast Asian countries toward a more positive view of 
the United States. Indonesia and Malaysia, with their large Muslim populations’ caution toward the 
U.S. compounding existing post-colonial issues, remain acutely sensitive to perceived U.S. imposi-
tions on their internal decision-making and policies. In the Malacca Straits these sensitivities mani-
fest themselves in the two littoral states’ absolute insistence that no foreign actors have any military 
or police presence there. They claim they are able to patrol and protect the Straits on their own – 
but are more than willing to accept monetary or technical assistance.  
Despite this resistance, Washington has managed to push through some small steps toward increas-
ing counterterrorism cooperation. The August 2002 joint ASEAN-U.S. declaration on counterter-
rorism cooperation was a significant political achievement stating the two parties’ intention to 
share information and intelligence regarding terrorist financing, liaise between law enforcement 
agencies, increase capacity-building efforts, assist on transportation, border and immigration con-
trol issues, and comply with the relevant UN resolutions on international terrorism.99 Singapore and 
Malaysia have made progress implementing these initiatives, while Indonesia has been slower. Ac-
tual cooperative projects began in late 2005 when the U.S. and ASEAN presented a new U.S.-
ASEAN Enhanced Partnership intended to “foster cooperation” on political, security, economic, 
social and educational issues. So far the U.S. strategy has been to implement relatively non-
controversial projects such as “post-tsunami assistance, research scholarships, artistic and cultural 
cooperation, a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and work on FTAs, and the develop-
ment of a science and technology agreement.”100 As the nature of these projects demonstrates, op-
erational, concrete U.S.-ASEAN security cooperation is quite limited, with no cooperation on 
counterterrorism despite the 2002 joint declaration.  
More cooperation occurs on the bilateral level in the form of joint training and exercises, though it 
is still limited. The U.S. Pacific Command conducts a number of yearly bilateral or multilateral 
military exercises with regional states, the largest being Cobra Gold in which both Singapore and 
Indonesia participate. Washington has praised both Indonesia and Malaysia on their recent impro-
vements in countering terrorism. In February 2005 the Bush administration invited Indonesia to 
participate in the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). In May 2005 it 
re-started sales of non-lethal military equipment to Jakarta and in November 2005 waived the Fo-
reign Military Financing restrictions for Indonesia.101  
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U.S.-Malaysian cooperation has also seen much improvement recently. Malaysian Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi has been lauded as a vocal supporter of moderate Islam and his country credited 
with taking steps to improve its legal framework for handling terrorists.102 Malaysia and the United 
States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on counterterrorism in May 2002 that for-
med the basis for the U.S.-ASEAN joint statement. The Bush administration has “downplayed U.S. 
human rights concerns over Malaysia’s use of its Internal Security Act (ISA) to imprison political 
opponents without trial, especially since Kuala Lumpur has employed the ISA against suspected 
members of [the terrorist groups] JI and Kampulan Mujiheddin Malaysia (KMM).”103 Like Indone-
sia, Malaysia participates in the Foreign Military Sales and IMET programs. It “also hosts between 
fifteen and twenty U.S. Navy ship visits annually and provides U.S. Navy SEALs the opportunity 
to train twice a year in jungle warfare in the country.”104 Malaysia opened the Southeast Asian Re-
gional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in 2003. The U.S. Department of State as well as 
other agencies such as the Pacific Command and Department of Defense collaborates with 
SEARCCT on a number of projects, both bilateral and multilateral, each year.105  
Singapore and the United States have extremely close ties and cooperate on some quite sensitive 
issues. Singapore was a founding member of the PSI and was the first Asian country to join the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), another U.S.-sponsored maritime security regime.106 The U.S. 
is trying to work with all three littoral states to develop the command, control and communications 
infrastucture along the Malacca Straits to facilitate maritime surveillance cooperation.107  
In sum, U.S. involvement in Southeast Asian counterterrorism is relatively extensive at the bilateral 
level. The United States’ joint declaration with ASEAN guides cooperation. However, neither the 
U.S. focus on military means of countering terrorism nor its perceived association of terrorism with 
Islam sits well with some regional states. U.S. counterterrorism strategies do not mesh well with 
the local states’ current policies, which center on rehabilitation rather than punishment of captured 
terrorists.108 (For a more detailed discussion of ASEAN counterterrorism policies see section 5.2.7 
below). The cooperation that has been achieved is hence largely the result of U.S. “prodding” and 
power politics.109 In order to facilitate more productive cooperation on counterterrorism, the United 
States should accommodate local states’ perspectives and approaches. Working together with Chi-
na and the European Union on the Malacca Straits terrorist attack scenario could result in precisely 
this productive counterterrorism cooperation with the littoral states, since both the EU and China 
advocate softer counterterrorism strategies than the U.S. and might provide a balance to anti-
American perceptions in the region. 
 
5.3.2.  United States-People’s Republic of China 
 
There is some cooperation between the U.S. and China on container and port security. Because the 
United States is such a large market and therefore essential to China’s continued economic growth, 
Beijing has aligned itself in support of the war on terror and cooperated with Washington in a 
number of ways. Just after 9/11 it voted with the rest of the UN Security Council to combat terror-
ism. China participates in the CSI, the United States Megaports Initiative and the U.S. Global Ini-
tiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and is signatory to agreements on freezing terrorist financing. 
Beijing hosted the fourth ARF meeting on counterterrorism in April 2006. PRC leadership also al-
lowed the FBI to establish a legal attaché office in Beijing. 
However, Beijing claims the war on terror has been defined too narrowly. As the self-proclaimed 
and increasingly accepted voice of the South/Third World, China and the Southeast Asian nations 
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share many of the same objections to U.S. counterterror strategies. Chinese leaders and analysts say 
the U.S. approach relies too heavily on military means and does not adequately address the root 
causes of terrorism, such as poverty in developing countries. Many experts in China “generally be-
lieve the Bush Administration’s approach to counterterrorism is overly aggressive, diplomatically 
impatient, and pays too little attention to the political and economic discontent of the Third World 
that gives rise to terror activities.”110 In line with its current policy of engaging Southeast Asia to 
demonstrate the non-threatening nature of its involvement in the region, China would likely stand 
up against U.S. wishes regarding counterterrorism in support of Southeast Asian priorities. For ex-
ample, Dennis Roy of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies points out that Beijing would 
probably not support any U.S. counterterrorism initiative perceived as “heavy-handed” by South-
east Asians, “both because China perceives the threat as less compelling and because the Chinese 
would see another opportunity to score public relations points against the Americans.”111 Contrary 
to Roy’s analysis, the Malacca Dilemma means that in this paper’s scenario Beijing would see the 
terrorist threat as compelling – perhaps not because China is as concerned about international ter-
rorism as the United States, but certainly because the attack would block Chinese energy supply 
lines. Yet Roy’s overall point still applies. The public relations factor would likely encourage 
China to seize the opportunity to present itself as the good guy against the U.S., thus hampering 
any attempts at counterterrorism cooperation. 
A great deal of mutual suspicion also hinders cooperation. The U.S. worries about Chinese ties to 
Pakistan, Iran and other states with questionable or rogue leaders. China is concerned that if the 
U.S. steps up its counterterrorism operations in Southeast Asia, the ensuing increase in U.S. mili-
tary presence would encircle China, block its energy supply routes and/or keep it from achieving its 
objectives in the region. Beijing particularly resists any perceived American attempt to control the 
Malacca Straits because China’s energy supply security depends so heavily on free access through 
the waterway.  
These perceived threats, which reflect Beijing’s largely realist worldview, have led the PRC to 
hedge in its counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. Although “China provided substantive in-
telligence in some counterterrorism cases … more work remained to be done in terms of its overall 
responsiveness to U.S. requests.”112 For example, in April 2002 the commanders of the Central and 
Pacific Commands separately confirmed that the intelligence China shared was “not specific 
enough, particularly as compared to cooperation from the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia.”113 
The PRC has thus been accused of being a “lukewarm partner” in the war on terror.114  
In sum, somewhat incompatible counterterrorism approaches, mututal suspicion and regional com-
petition have thus far constrained U.S.-Chinese cooperation to some port security initiatives and 
declarations of support for counterterrorism. The two countries have very different approaches to 
security and counterterrorism. Chinese counterterrorism at least rhetorically resembles Southeast 
Asian strategies, focusing on multilateral, comprehensive approaches, addressing the roots of ter-
rorism and targeting rehabilitation rather than retribution. Also like ASEAN the PRC prefers con-
sensual, informal security agreements rather than legally binding treaties. There is thus very little in 
the way of an existing U.S.-China cooperation framework upon which trilateral or multilateral co-
operation could be built. Models for cooperation will have to be found elsewhere. As discussed in 
section 4, though, both countries have such strong interests in keeping the Malacca Straits open and 
safe that this scenario may provide the jump-start necessary to overcome the cooperational difficul-
ties they now face. China could, moreover, take the lead in approaching ASEAN states for coopera-
tion since it has proven itself adept at ASEAN (Asian?)-style dialogue and decision making. 
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5.3.3  United States-European Union 
 
In contrast to the U.S.-China relationship, the United States and European Union work together 
closely on counterterrorism. Unfortunately for this study their cooperation primarily takes place 
transatlantically rather than in Southeast Asia. Still, such close cooperation between two powers 
with extremely different approaches to and perceptions of terrorism gives hope that some coopera-
tion may also be possible in the Malacca Straits.  
The U.S. and EU define terrorism in fundamentally different ways. The U.S. sees terrorism as an 
act of war, to be protected against at home and preemptively fought overseas. Europe, on the other 
hand, views terrorism as a crime, a matter for law enforcement and the justice system. The U.S. 
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security deal with terrorism, while in Europe terrorism is 
under the purview of the police, intelligence communities and the judiciary. The EU tries to include 
as many countries as possible in counterterrorism efforts to help build “an international system of 
norms and rules working against terrorism.” It attempts “to integrate third states into a network of 
managerial counter-terrorism tasks.”115 By contrast the U.S. counterterrorism approach is far more 
unilateral, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Thus, even between these close allies difficulties persist 
because the U.S. often perceives EU institutions and policies as too weak while the EU sees the 
U.S. as too demanding of one-sided “cooperation” in which the U.S. “expects intelligence from 
others, but does not readily share its own.”116 Moreover, because the EU has only limited military 
presence in Southeast Asia through its member states the UK and France, there is no EU-U.S. hard 
security cooperation in the region. Although France and the UK have both collaborated with the 
SEARCCT in Malaysia on some counterterrorism training seminars, with which the United States 
also cooperates heavily, the U.S. is not normally involved in the same programs as the EU states.117 
Despite these differences of approach the U.S. and EU have established closer contacts between all 
levels of law enforcement and government officials since 9/11. The Secretary of State, U.S. Attor-
ney General and Secretary of Homeland Security meet with their EU counterparts at least once a 
year. There is a U.S.-EU working group comprising senior officials who meet biannually to discuss 
police and judicial counterterrorism cooperation. Europol and the FBI have exchanged both liason 
officers and information about suspected terrorists and their financing.118 Recent agreements on 
exchanges of personal information were pushed through despite some resistance among European 
populations concerned about data security and individual privacy rights. The two parties have also 
agreed treaties on extradition, border control and transport security.  
The EU’s emphasis on multilateralism could provide important lessons learned for counterterror-
ism cooperation in Southeast Asia. As discussed above, both Southeast Asian states as well as 
China resist anything that appears to be heavy-handed or unilateral U.S. policies in the region. The 
EU has experience agreeing on common counterterrorism standards with third parties. It has 
“mainstreamed” counterterrorism cooperation into its external relations with its immediate 
neighbors, meaning it “consciously exerts ‘soft pressure’ in order to make partners meet interna-
tional counter-terrorism requirements or standards agreed upon in bilateral agreements.” Soft pres-
sure can be applied through dialogue, technical assistance or trade agreements.119 Of course, the 
United States also uses such pressure to push through its wishes. The difference is a matter of ap-
proach and perception: the U.S. has long been, and been seen as, a military great power in the re-
gion. The EU has cultivated its image as a soft power, though it is now aiming for ‘security actor’ 
status. If the two powers work together in the Malacca Straits, they may (with China) balance one 
another to present a more acceptable face not only to the local states but also to one another. 
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5.3.4  European Union-Southeast Asia 
 
EU involvement in Southeast Asian security affairs was until very recently almost nonexistent. To 
date it remains mostly rhetorical. However, the increasing number and scope of EU meetings and 
dialogues with East and Southeast Asian states on security affairs attests to Brussels’ interest in 
becoming more involved. More specifically the EU has already shown some interest in joining 
counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia.  
The EU and ASEAN have recently been engaging in more inter-regional cooperation. In 2003 they 
signed a Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and in November 2007 released a 
Plan of Action to implement the March 2007 Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced 
Partnership. The section on terrorism within this highly detailed plan of action emphasizes informa-
tion sharing and capacity building; the UN in a leading role and the UN’s counter-terrorism strat-
egy as the guiding document for EU-ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation; and EU support of 
regional and national counter-terrorism efforts in Southeast Asia. The document highlights the pri-
orities and preferences shared by the two sides: focus on the UN, capacity building, a comprehen-
sive approach, and multilateral cooperation. It mentions EU technical assistance to ASEAN states a 
number of times. EU policy links counterterrorism to countries’ development strategies and the 
development aid it provides. The 2003 European Commission strategy paper on Southeast Asia, for 
example, emphasizes the “broader issues of political, social, economic and financial governance” 
in the fight against terrorism.120 As in many other regions, EU counterterrorism cooperation with 
Southeast Asia focuses on capacity building, economic and social development and local owner-
ship of initiatives. The plan of action’s section on disaster management and emergency response 
contains similar foci. It envisions the EU helping ASEAN states improve their own emergency re-
sponse capabilities rather than the EU swooping in with its own resources only when needed.121  
In general, the EU’s counterterrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia reflects its overall policy of 
soft influence and multilateralism – as well as its current inability to sustain a significant military 
presence in such a far-flung region. In terms of harder security cooperation, the two EU member 
states with military presence in Southeast Asia, France and the UK, have also involved their police 
and security services in training seminars with the SEARCCT in Malaysia.122 This cooperation was 
always minimal, however, and has been nonexistent since 2005. Nonetheless it did take place and 
could be revived. The EU’s increasing political engagement in counterterrorism in recent years 
does indicate its willingness and desire to become more involved as a political and security actor in 
the region. Cooperating in the Malacca Straits to build on existing training and capacity-building 
programs would be a good way to deepen this involvement. 
 
 
5.3.5  European Union-People’s Republic of China 
 
The EU and China have not initiated any bilateral counterterrorism initiatives, although the annual 
EU-China Summit addresses terrorism and releases a statement that, like many ASEM and 
ASEAN-EU documents, normally highlights the two sides’ similar approaches. In fact, some of the 
exact sentences from the Joint Statement of the 10th EU-China Summit appear in the Chair’s Sum-
mary of the ASEM Conference on Counter-Terrorism. Shared EU-PRC values include “recognition 
of the United Nations as the only truly global forum for the fight against terrorism” as well as uni-
versal adherence to and implementation of all UN conventions and protocols, de-linking terrorism 
from association with any specific religion or culture, and respect for “international law, in particu-
lar international human rights law.” One telling sentence in both documents states that “[e]ffective 
counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting, but complemen-
tary and mutually reinforcing goals.”123 That the EU and China have systematically agreed on this 
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set of values indicates they may be willing to work together on more concrete counterterrorism pro-
jects.  
It remains to be seen, however, whether this agreement will hold under pressure from the United 
States to take harder or more military measures. For example, German analyst Kay Moeller pointed 
out that Europe must clearly understand it is far more dependent on the U.S. than on strategic part-
ners such as China, Japan or India in the fight against terrorism.124 For all its rhetoric favoring mul-
tilateral cooperation and combatting the roots of terrorism, the EU has bent to pressure from Wash-
ington on personal data information sharing, airplane passenger data, and law enforcement for sus-
pected terrorists. These changes not only fail to address the roots of terrorism but also allow the 
U.S. to act more unilaterally against individuals suspected of terrorism.125 Yet the ASEAN states as 
well as China support a more EU-style, softer, roots-based approach to counterterrorism. The EU 
and China could possibly work together to encourage the U.S. to take a softer approach in the Ma-
lacca Straits. Cooperating under the framework of some of the applicable UN conventions may be 
possible and would certainly be agreeable to the littoral states as well as China and the EU.  
 
5.3.6  People’s Republic of China -Southeast Asia 
 
As in other fields, cooperation between China and Southeast Asia on terrorism and other non-
traditional security issues has skyrocketed in the last decade, particularly since 2002. A Joint Dec-
laration on non-traditional security cooperation was signed at the 6th ASEAN-China Summit in 
November 2002, followed by a Memorandum of Understanding in January 2004. Since 2004 the 
two parties have conducted annual informal ministerial meetings on transnational crime and pub-
lished Annual Work Plans to guide capacity building exercises and other cooperation. This coop-
eration is not directed specifically against terrorism, though it does include terrorism as one issue to 
be addressed. The MoU focuses on such “non-traditional security issues as trafficking in illegal 
drugs, people smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms 
smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime.” Cooperation takes 
place in the areas of information exchange, personnel exchange and training, law enforcement co-
operation, and joint research. Importantly, China takes a leading role in the cooperation, organizing 
workshops to exchange experiences and holding training courses to “upgrade the level of capacity 
of each Party in the region.”126 China gains valuable experience as the teacher rather than the stu-
dent in PRC-ASEAN cooperation. Of course, cooperation is conducted in strict accordance with 
the ASEAN principles of respecting national laws and sovereignty and not interfering in domestic 
affairs. Both parties seem pleased with the way cooperation is developing, as they decided in No-
vember 2007 to extend the MoU for one year after its expiration date in January 2009. Ministers 
from both sides are tasked with reviewing and revising the MoU during the extension period to 
bring cooperation in line with “the emerging challenges and increasing scope of transnational crime 
cooperation.”127 Some very limited bilateral cooperation on biological and chemical terrorism also 
takes take place within the SEARCCT.128 
Despite these significant political steps, military cooperation is still hesitant. After the 7th ASEAN-
China Summit in 2003, which produced the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Part-
nership for Peace and Prosperity, the two parties developed an extensive, detailed Plan of Action to 
implement the strategic partnership. This document lists a wide variety of initiatives and activities 
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to increase cooperation and bring the two parties closer together. One of the shortest sections is on 
military exchanges and cooperation. It lists five action points: promoting mutual confidence and 
trust in the defence and military fields with a view to maintaining peace and stability in the re-
gion; conducting dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defence issues; strengthen-
ing cooperation on military personnel training; considering observing each other’s military exer-
cises and exploring the possibility of conducting bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises; 
and exploring and enhancing cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.129 Note that nothing is 
phrased in definite or absolute language. The parties must only consider observing military exer-
cises or conducting joint exercises. This uncommitted language partly indicates continuing ASEAN 
suspicion of Chinese intentions but also reflects the ASEAN (or Asian) penchant for informal 
agreements over binding, legal ones. In order for further cooperation to take place ASEAN mistrust 
of China will have to be dispelled. As mentioned above, multilateral cooperation may be one effec-
tive way for China to demonstrate its non-hegemonic intentions. 
 
5.3.7  Multilateral Cooperation 
 
The primary multilateral fora for discussing security issues and counterterrrorism in Southeast Asia 
are ASEAN and the ARF. ASEM plays a smaller role. The ARF has been conducting meetings on 
counterterrrorism and international crime since 2003. These regular dialogues have become in-
creasingly specific and concrete, though much remains to be done. Cooperation is still limited to 
dialogue and confidence building rather than concrete cooperative exercises. The 2007 ARF Secu-
rity Policy Conference noted that in order to deal more effectively with terrorism, states must work 
together. It recommended that, inter alia, member states improve their abilities to manage the con-
sequences of disasters and increase cooperation between security forces and other actors “such as 
the academe.”130 Not only could both recommendations easily be applied to security in the Malacca 
Straits, but their implementation would also likely help accustom member states to concrete multi-
lateral security cooperation within the ARF.  
ASEAN has recently made significant progress, at least on paper, toward regional counterterrorism 
cooperation. The legally binding ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) was signed in 
January 2007. ASEAN is developing a regional approach to counterterrorism that not only embod-
ies agreed values such as “identifying and effectively addressing the root causes of terrorism,” but 
also specifically stresses the organization’s desire to strengthen and deepen regional cooperation. 
The ASEAN counterterrorism approach also focuses on rehabilitation of convicted terrorists rather 
than retribution. However, as is often the case with ASEAN the Convention is more a political 
statement of unity than a document outlining a concrete strategy. It is hampered by ASEAN’s ever-
present emphasis on sovereignty, territorial integrity and respect for domestic laws. It only encour-
ages (rather than ‘requires’ or even ‘calls on’) member states to acceed to all relevant international 
conventions and protocols on terrorism. It makes suggestions for what states could do to counter, 
suppress or prevent terrorism but does not go into detail about how to do so. It does outline some 
details on cooperation between the states but indicates that on the international level ASEAN will 
only support initiatives with significant United Nations involvement.131 The document is a signifi-
cant political step for ASEAN – concrete evidence of its intent to become more than an economic 
cooperation organization – but it lacks teeth.  
The ASEAN Convention cannot function as a platform upon which the external actors can build 
multilateral security cooperation simply because, not being ASEAN states, they are not parties to 
the agreement. Rather, it indicates the direction ASEAN intends to head in the future and therefore 
acts as a guide for what the external actors can expect from the regional states in terms of counter-
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terrorism strategies and policies. The Convention hints at how the external actors might fit them-
selves into the regional scheme for countering and preventing terrorism. They could cooperate in 
accordance with this document to increase security in the Malacca Straits without inciting resis-
tance from local states. Since ASEAN has indicated elsewhere (in its declaration of intent to create 
an ASEAN Security Community, the Bali Concord II of 2003) that it places heavy emphasis on 
maritime security issues, the Malacca Straits may provide a particularly good opportunity for ex-
ternal cooperation to support such security-building.132 The ARF would be a good platform for this 
support and cooperation. 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) excludes this paper’s third important external actor, the United 
States. Unsurprisingly, ASEM statements on counterterrorism contain much of the same, or similar, 
language as many ASEAN and EU documents and reflect a decidedly different approach to terror-
ism than that employed by the United States. As mentioned in section 5.3.5, Europe and East Asia 
share many of the same perceptions of and approaches to terrorism, such as the belief that dealing 
with the root causes of terrorism must be prioritized; that the United Nations should play a leading 
role in the global fight against terror; that countering terrorism requires “broadening and enhancing 
mutual understanding among cultures and civilizations”; and that “the fight against terrorism re-
quires a comprehensive approach by the international community comprising political, economic, 
diplomatic, legal and other means, fully respecting the rule of law.”133 Note that military means 
were specifically not mentioned. Instead, the ASEM counter-terrorism vision comprises primarily 
information sharing, reducing poverty, promoting inter-faith and inter-cultural understanding and 
countering radicalization. The most recent ASEM conference on counter-terrorism indicated that 
participating parties would cooperate in capacity-building and technical assistance, meaning essen-
tially that European states would help Asian ones improve their own abilities.134  
Some concrete multilateral counterterrorism cooperation does already take place under the auspices 
of the SEARCCT in Malaysia. For example, a seminar in 2005 on the prevention and crisis mana-
gement of biological terrorism included participants from France, the United States, China, Malay-
sia, Indonesia and Singapore. This seminar was the exception to the rule, however. Most of the se-
minars and courses at SEARCCT involve either intra-ASEAN cooperation or ASEAN-USA bilate-
ral cooperation.135 Still, SEARCCT is an established, functioning center for counterterrorism coo-
peration. It has worked with all the parties involved in this paper’s scenario, if one considers EU 
member states as representatives of the EU.136 SEARCCT is thus positioned to provide the founda-
tions for much more extensive multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. This cooperation could 
easily be funneled into the Malacca Straits. 
 
 
5.4.  Summary: Overlapping Interests 
 
Although numerous efforts have been made both to improve maritime security and counter terror-
ism, resistance from and competition among the littoral states (as well as geopolitical great-power 
competition outside the scope of this paper) have thus far prevented truly successful, operational 
cooperation. The external actors should still make attempts to help improve security in the Malacca 
Straits, however, if only because of their extensive interests in the waterway. Their economic and 
security interests would be immensely damaged by a terrorist attack in the Straits. Although their 
approaches to terrorism differ, each actor’s individual interests in the Straits should bring the three 
together for this scenario. 
As discussed in section 4, all three actors have economic interests in the Malacca Straits – the EU 
and China direct interests, the U.S. indirect. They all want to ensure the free flow of shipping 
                                                     
132  Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 October 2003, 
www.aseansec.org/15160.htm (accessed 8 July 2008). 
133  Asia-Europe Meeting, Chair’s Summary. 
134  Asia-Europe Meeting, Chair’s Summary. 
135  SEARCCT, “Courses & Seminars.”  
136  Since member states control their foreign policy individually, their decisions do apply in this case. Moreover, the 
presence of EU member states could smooth the way for an official EU role in counterterrorism cooperation in the 
Malacca Straits. 
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through the Straits since all of their economies would suffer greatly from a five-day blockage. The 
actors also all have security interests in the waterway. The U.S. wants to maintain its military supe-
riority in the region, which requires free passage through the Straits. The EU wants to ensure inter-
national maritime security and has recently linked security in the Malacca Straits with its efforts to 
counter international terrorism. Some EU member states also have individual security interests in 
the Straits. China wants both to secure its energy supply, which depends heavily on unrestricted 
passage through the Malacca Straits, and to mitigate U.S. influence in the region. The apparent ten-
sion here between U.S. and Chinese interests should not apply in this scenario since both countries 
have acknowledged the benefits of multilateral cooperation and neither one wants a regional power 
struggle or arms race. Though they might compete for regional influence, they may both agree to 
cooperate on this specific issue given the importance of security in the Straits to each of them indi-
vidually. Overlapping interests in ensuring free, safe passage through the Straits for all shipping 
(military and merchant) should induce the three external actors to cooperate on Malacca Straits se-
curity issues.  
A further impetus for the three stakeholders to work together is their overlapping interests in multi-
lateral cooperation in Southeast Asia. These interests may not directly relate to terrorism in the Ma-
lacca Straits. The EU wants to establish itself as a global security actor while also promoting its 
core norm of multilateralism. China has established a policy of cooperation with ASEAN to dem-
onstrate its benign intentions toward the region. China would also benefit enormously from coop-
eration with the other actors. It would improve its technical abilities by learning from the U.S. and 
EU as well as its teaching abilities by providing training to the ASEAN states. Cooperation would 
benefit the U.S. by showing it is neither as heavy-handed nor unilateral as most regional states ex-
pect. Reflecting these interests in cooperation, the EU and China continually encourage multilateral 
cooperation under UN law. The U.S. has also started to include more multilateral cooperation in its 
rhetoric, for example with the naval services’ new strategy paper or its failed RMSI proposal. 
There is thus a trilateral convergence of not only interests in cooperation but also strategies for ap-
proaching security issues. All three stakeholders at least rhetorically support a strategy of multilat-
eral cooperation. This paper’s scenario would be an excellent opportunity for the actors to practice 
what they preach about multilateralism, given the imperative of working multilaterally to avoid 
angering the littoral states. 
Finally, the external actors share a primary concern about a large-scale attack that blocks the 
Straits, unlike the littoral states who focus on piracy, navigational safety and environmental issues. 
At their September 2007 meeting in Jakarta, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pa-
cific (CSCAP) Study Group on the Security of the Malacca and Singapore Straits acknowledged 
this difference in priorities. The study group stated that the  
“concerns of the user countries relate mainly to low probability, high consequence scenarios like terrorism, while 
the concerns of the littoral countries relate mainly to high incidence, high environmental consequences that may 
occur frequently but attract less attention internationally.”137 
Unfortunately for the external actors, the littoral states’ concerns have taken priority. The CSCAP 
study group meeting began “by acknowledging the decreasing attention towards piracy and mari-
time terrorism, although there has been increasing attention to address the less controversial issues 
of navigational safety and marine environmental protection.”138 Indeed, the most recent and suc-
cessful initiative to date, the Cooperative Mechanism, deals far more with navigational safety and 
environmental protection than piracy or terrorism. Even ReCAAP, the other relatively successful 
cooperation effort, covers only piracy, not terrorism. SEARCCT, which deals specifically with ter-
rorism, has only conducted two maritime terrorism-related seminars in the last five years.139 As 
discussed in section 2.2, the three external actors are not as affected by piracy as are local states 
due to the types of ships they send through the Straits. Thus, although there are security concerns in 
the Malacca Straits that require multilateral responses, differing priorities may hinder cooperation. 
The three external actors’ shared concern about a devastating terrorist attack that damages their 
                                                     
137  Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Study Group on the Security of the Malacca and Singapore 
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138  CSCAP Study Group, 1. 
139  SEARCCT, “Courses & Seminars.” 
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international shipping and regional or global security interests, in contrast to the littoral states’ pre-
occupation with everyday security, is a final compelling reason for the three to cooperate.  
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6.  Recommendations and Further Research 
 
In light of the interests, strategies, priorities and current cooperation discussed above, this paper 
makes a number of recommendations for the three external actors to implement concrete multilat-
eral cooperation to improve maritime security in the Malacca Straits, particularly to defend the 
Straits against terrorist attacks like the scenario examined here. These recommendations incorpo-
rate the external actors’ interests in keeping the Straits open to all shipping and in trilateral or mul-
tilateral cooperation as well as the littoral states’ and ASEAN’s concerns about national sover-
eignty and perceived interference in internal affairs. It is crucial that the external actors remain sen-
sitive to the littoral states’ concerns, or they will encounter only resistance.  
This paper developed a hypothetical scenario in order to see how the three external actors interact 
with one another in the Southeast Asian context, how they interact with the littoral states, and what 
opportunities exist for them to further their interests in cooperation and maritime security in the 
Malacca Straits. The recommendations for cooperation are thus based on the assumption that cer-
tain inhibiting geopolitical influences – such as the very real tension between China and the United 
States – would not affect the relationships inside the scenario’s “petri dish.” This paper has demon-
strated that multilateral cooperation to improve security in the Malacca Straits is in the interests of 
all three external actors and would benefit them all in a number of different ways. It has shown not 
only that opportunities for cooperation do exist, but also that some foundations for constructing 
further cooperation are already in place. The recommendations below indicate how such coopera-
tion can and should be built. However, the larger geopolitical influences must be factored in before 
cooperation can succeed. The next step for research is therefore a much longer, more extensive 
study of the larger influences on maritime security in the Malacca Straits. More specific sugges-
tions for further research follow the recommendations section. 
 
 
6.1  Recommendations 
 
Littoral States as Key Actors and Key Partners: The littoral states need to be included as the pri-
mary actors in any cooperation, with the three external actors in facilitiating and supporting roles. 
There is no way for the three external actors to cooperate trilaterally; they must include the littoral 
states in multilateral cooperation. ASEAN states are highly sensitive to any perceived interference 
in their internal affairs. Malaysia in particular loudly protests any foreign forces patrolling the Ma-
lacca Straits, considering it a violation of national sovereignty. The external actors must therefore 
exercise extreme diplomacy when making suggestions for maritime security and/or counterterror-
ism initiatives or activities. They must allow the littoral states to take the lead in organizing and 
promoting cooperation. They should avoid appearing to “gang up” on the littoral states, instead 
emphasizing the equal, multilateral nature of the cooperation. They should stress their role as facili-
tators (of capacity building, development cooperation, counterterrorism initiatives, joint exercises, 
etc.) rather than primary actors. They should also draw on the ASEAN Convention on Counter Ter-
rorism as well as the relevant UN conventions for guidance on the littoral states’ policies and pri-
orities. 
Emphasis on a Comprehensive Approach to Terrorism: The EU, China and ASEAN states all place 
heavy emphasis (at least rhetorically) on involving not only military but also political, economic, 
legal and social methods to address terrorism. The United States increasingly incorporates these 
non-military methods into its policy papers as well. Similar emphasis during multilateral coopera-
tion on security in the Malacca Straits would therefore be helpful. In particular, the actors should 
base their cooperation on the comprehensive approach to counterterrorism outlined by the United 
Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and elaborated in the relevant ASEAN, ASEM and EU-
China/EU-ASEAN/China-ASEAN documents. The external actors should pool their resources to 
fund and facilitate programs that build on the counterterrorism methods outlined in these docu-
ments. For example, countering the roots of terrorism is one popular issue among the six relevant 
actors. However, the fundamental causes of terrorism may vary from country to country and con-
text to context. The external stakeholders could therefore sponsor or organize programs designed to 
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first identify and then (hopefully) alleviate the circumstances that drive people to terrorism in 
Southeast Asia. 
Focus on Capacity Building: All three external actors already have some kind of capacity-building 
program(s) with the littoral states to improve local abilities to secure the Straits. These programs 
indicate a convergence of strategies between the three external actors. Capacity-building programs 
would thus be an excellent platform for further cooperation between the three actors – especially 
since these programs inherently include the littoral states as the primary parties. Capacity building 
programs on maritime surveillance and interdiction, for example, could be conducted by the exter-
nal states’ coast guards – not their navies. Navies are a widely accepted symbol of hard power and 
would likely be seen as intruding into sovereign territory. The littoral states could even construe 
external naval presence as a push for physical control of the Straits, which would lead to political 
and possibly military confrontation. Coast guards can provide many of the same capacity-building 
services but do not carry the same hard power connotations as navies. The United States Coast 
Guard already conducts some capacity building exercises such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness 
and Training (CARAT), which trains Southeast Asian nations including the three Malacca littoral 
states in maritime law enforcement and search and rescue.140 The Five Power Defence Arrange-
ment has already conducted at least one maritime counterterrorism exercise, the “Bersama Lima 
04” drill in which the parties tracked and boarded a “hijacked ship” in the South China Sea.141 
These exercises could be expanded to include the other external stakeholders as well as new topics. 
Other areas for capacity building could include emergency disaster response (a particular EU 
strength), including disasters other than terrorism, or helping implement the IMO safety and secu-
rity code in all applicable ports in the Straits. Incorporating counterterrorism into a package of ca-
pacity-building on larger non-traditional security issues would be more easily accepted by both 
ASEAN states and China, as demonstrated in the ASEAN-China agreements on non-traditional 
security. The external states should take advantage of the improved communications systems in the 
Straits (for example the Changi C2 Centre) when conducting these capacity-building programs. 
Develop Existing Multilateral Cooperation Mechanisms: As discussed above, there are a number 
of promising institutions for expanding multilateral cooperation on maritime security and counter-
terrorism in the Malacca Straits. First, the external actors should strengthen their concrete coopera-
tion within the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF is the only multilateral forum in which all three 
external actors participate. It has been expanding the scope of its activities and now incorporates 
both counterterrorism and maritime security into its regular dialogues. The ARF has also been a 
platform for joint military exercises. To date, however, most cooperation within the ARF has been 
no more than dialogue and confidence-building. The external actors should work together to en-
courage and facilitate more joint exercises, including real-life exercises rather than just simulations. 
The ARF would also be an excellent forum for hosting the capacity-building initiatives discussed 
above. Cooperation within the ARF would automatically keep the littoral states in the limelight, as 
required, since the ARF is an ASEAN institution. Before cooperation within the ARF could take 
place, however, the United States would need to step up its engagement in the forum. Specifically, 
it should acceed to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). China has already signed 
the TAC, as has France. The UK and EU have both signalled their intention to join, although the 
EU must wait for ASEAN to revise the treaty so that non-states can join.142 The U.S. should also 
join as a display of its willingness to cooperate multilaterally. 
In addition, the three external actors should significantly increase their cooperative engagement in 
such institutions as the SEARCCT, the Changi C2 Centre and the ReCAAP Information Sharing 
Centre. These three locally-based, locally-operated centers already have much of the communica-
tions structures and resources to support multilateral cooperation. SEARCCT is positioned to sup-
port further counterterrorism cooperation but lacks a significant maritime component, while the 
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141  Joshua Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” Military Technology 5/2005, 18. 
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Changi C2 Centre and ReCAAP ISC are strong in maritime security but weak in counterterrorism. 
The external actors should facilitate cross-communication and cooperation between these three 
centers, bringing in as many actors with as much expertise as possible. They should promote a 
more maritime component in SEARCCT courses and seminars and more counterterrorism activit-
ites in Changi C2 and ReCAAP ISC. These centers are all relatively new; they are ripe for a great 
deal of capacity-building and experience-sharing. The three external actors could contribute their 
expertise within this setting, working together to engage the littoral states. Moreover, the centers 
are also explicitly multinational. They are designed for international and multilateral coordination 
and cooperation and are therefore an excellent forum for the external actors to become more in-
volved in security cooperation in the Malacca Straits without threatening the local states. Strength-
ening cooperation between these three centers would be a giant step in promoting multilateral co-
operation to increase security in the Malacca Straits.  
 
 
6.2  Further Discussion/Research 
 
Further examine the littoral states’ actual position on trilateral cooperation. Even if the three ex-
ternal actors are careful to keep the littoral states in the center of the action, they might find their 
attempts to cooperate rebuffed. Malaysia and Indonesia have been highly vocal in protesting out-
side involvement in Malacca Straits security issues. They are willing to accept foreign funds and 
some capacity building but are indignant when they perceive outsiders as getting too closely in-
volved. It is necessary for researchers to thoroughly investigate these two littoral states’ positions 
on external involvement. It may be that they are more receptive to cooperation with external actors 
than their public statements suggest. On the other hand, they may also be just as against such coop-
eration as it seems. In either case the external actors must consider the littoral states’ positions and 
design their policies accordingly. 
Do an extensive study of the actual possibilities for cooperation, taking into account the geopoliti-
cal challenges to such cooperation. As indicated above, there are a number of geopolitical influ-
ences this paper does not take into account but which would certainly affect any real attempts at 
cooperation. The very real U.S.-China tension over regional influence has already been mentioned. 
Other possible geopolitical challenges include resistance from EU member states that do not want 
to engage in such a far-flung region, that are concerned about the large EU-China trade imbalance, 
or that protest human rights abuses in China; similar resistance from groups in the U.S.; insistence 
from some in the U.S. on acting unilaterally or more heavy-handedly than the other actors like; a 
decision in Peking that unilateral military buildup and engagement is the best solution to the Ma-
lacca Dilemma; and/or a judgment in Washington, Brussels or Beijing that other risks outweigh the 
terrorist threat in Malacca and should be given priority. Any of these factors could hamper coopera-
tion in the Malacca Straits. Yet as this paper has shown, the three actors have very real, very strong 
interests not only in protecting free shipping through the Straits but also in multilateral cooperation 
in the region. Researchers should therefore conduct an in-depth, long-term study on the realistic 
possibilities for cooperation, taking into account all identifiable hindrances and developing options 
for overcoming or avoiding them. Such research should be conducted in close contact with the na-
tional governments in order to produce as clear and accurate a picture of the situation as possible.  
Examine the possibility of including Japan in cooperation. Japan has interests in the Malacca 
Straits similar to China’s. The vast majority of Japanese energy imports passes through the Straits. 
Although Japan does not seek regional military influence, it does have strong security interests in 
maintaining regional peace and stability. Moreover, unlike China or most of the other regional 
powers, Japan has not only been heavily involved in regional peace- and security-building for 
many years but has also designated a large amount of funds for research and activities in these ar-
eas. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), for example, was founded in 1974 spe-
cifically to provide funds and technical assistance to poorer countries. It has been very involved in 
counterterrorism capacity-building projects with SEARCCT since at least 2003. Japanese think 
tanks and institutions already conduct a significant amount of research on regional security issues. 
Japan is thus a regional power with the resources, institutional scaffolding and willpower already in 
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place to support and participate in security cooperation in the Malacca Straits. The possibilities for 
bringing Japan in as a major cooperation partner should therefore be explored. 
Explore EU-U.S.-China cooperation in other regions/on other issues. Cooperation in the Malacca 
Straits would, hopefully, demonstrate that these three major powers all benefit from working to-
gether more than they would from going it alone. It might also open doors for cooperation on more 
sensitive issues, such as Taiwan, or in other regions, such as Africa. This expanded cooperation is 
most likely wishful thinking, given the current geopolitical situation. Yet it is nonetheless extreme-
ly important to encourage governments to consider working together on these issues. Further re-
search and discussion on the possibilities for these three global actors to cooperate in other fields 
would highlight their common or intersecting interests as well as the positive effects of working 
together. Further research should also carry this idea into wider areas and broader topics to explore 
the possibilities for trilateral or multilateral cooperation in other fields. 
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